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ABSTRACT
ACCOUNTING FOR THE SITUATIONAL CONTEXT OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Welton Chang
Philip E. Tetlock, PhD
Accountability is often presented as a panacea for behavioral ailments. This one-size-fitsall approach to a multi-dimensional construct ignores a key component of the
effectiveness of accountability systems: situational context. Situational contexts such as
highly stochastic environments (e.g., financial markets, world politics) and politicallycharged domains (e.g., national security decision-making, domestic policy) form
accountability boundary conditions, beyond which previous experimental effects may not
generalize. In a series of studies, I explore the relatively under-explored frontiers of
accountability effects, including those that apply to highly stochastic environments;
politically-charged outcomes, where the tendency towards motivated reasoning
dominates; and rapidly evolving states of information, where one’s ability to update one’s
beliefs has serious implications for the quality of one’s judgments and decisions. In this
series of studies, I find that accountability effects only appeared under certain conditions.
In general, holding people accountable for their judgments did not improve performance
on highly stochastic or politically-charged tasks—in fact, it sometimes made performance
worse. However, certain types of accountability were able to boost performance in some
contexts. These studies demonstrate the value of incorporating situational context into
accountability experiments.
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INTRODUCTION
“Hold them accountable!” is a common refrain heard when things go wrong.
Accountability, as popularly depicted, is the antidote for all manner of behavioral
ailments from the unnecessary use of force by police officers to the support of unpopular
policies and legislation by elected officials. Every day and at every turn, we feel the
effects of being held accountable for our thoughts and actions. Workers must answer to
employers, students to professors, law enforcement officers to city councils, CEOs to
boards of directors, and heads of state to the electorate. People generally accept that there
are behavioral rules that everyone must follow and that people are responsible for their
actions under those rules (Frink & Klimoski, 1998; Hobbes, 1969). A cohesive society
can only work if there are established mechanisms for calling people to account (Tetlock,
1992). At some point, all of us have to answer to someone.
Accountability refers to the way in which one or more people perceive that
someone must answer to whom, why, for what, and with what consequences (cf. Lerner &
Tetlock 2003; Chang, Vieider & Tetlock, in preparation; Patil, Vieider, Tetlock, 2014).
The study of accountability is no less popular today than it was in 1999, when it was
referred to as a “modern buzzword” (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). In fact, accountability has
arguably risen to the level of “cultural keyword” (Dubnick, 2014)—an unsurprising
development given its historical trajectory. Today, accountability is a nearly ubiquitous
method for generating predictable behavior.
Within the social psychological literature, the anticipation of being held
responsible for one’s actions has been shown to improve performance on tasks in both
laboratory experiments and field studies (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). However, these
1

studies show that the effects of accountability are not uniform: within the family of
concepts that resemble full-fledged accountability systems, only certain flavors of
accountability lead to desired effects on certain categories of subject behavior (Lerner &
Tetlock, 1999). Accountability generally works in one of two ways. First, some forms of
accountability pressures focus the attention of subjects, which spurs higher levels of
deliberate thinking which sometimes allows them to push aside attractive but incorrect
intuitive answers. Second, the presence of accountability systems incentivizes subjects to
focus on how to achieve desired outcomes (i.e., the process), thereby enabling them to
stop obsessing unhelpfully over only the end result (Lerner & Tetlock, 2003). In effect,
accountability assumes that the skill to achieve goals is sufficient but motivation is
lacking. However, as the definition of accountability makes clear, accountability systems
have many components, the unique combinations of which may have different influences
on behavior.
Situational Context and Accountability
One under-explored aspect of accountability systems is that of situational context
(Chang, in preparation). While accountability systems are designed to generate
predictable behavior from those held to account, many environments may not permit
subjects to generate the desired behavior or may incentivize individuals to deviate from
normatively prescribed choices. Such a situation exists when the accountable are held to
strictly enforced yet unachievable standards.
The under-exploration of context in accountability is related to Kahneman and
Klein’s (2009) discussion on the environmental conditions necessary for the development
of intuitive expertise—better judgments and decisions require “valid cues and good
2

feedback” (p. 524). The context within which people are held accountable may
sometimes impose a hard limit on performance, making it impossible or nearly
impossible to achieve prescribed standards. For example, being held accountable in
highly dynamic environments such as financial markets or battlefields may not improve
performance simply because there is a low ceiling on performance. In environments
where the performance of those held accountable depends on the behavior of other actors
(e.g., teachers and students, police officers and criminals, doctors and patients), again,
those held to account do not have full control over outcomes.
Many accountability systems are designed to improve judgments via debiasing
and improving decisions by ensuring that certain rules are followed. While it might strike
most as obvious that these systems should reduce errors, both false negatives (e.g.,
declaring someone a threat when they are not) and false positives (e.g., not declaring
someone a threat when they are), there has been relatively little investigation of how
accountability system designs push people away from committing one error over the
other (Tetlock & Mellers, 2011b). For example, while tens of thousands of refugees
arrive annually, the number of terrorists among them is tiny, with approximately 150
arrested in 15 years. However, if a false negative is extremely costly, meaning a terrorist
gets through the refugee screening process, but a false positive less so (subjecting the
innocent to additional scrutiny), then an immigration official, accountable for keeping out
terrorists, would rationally make it very difficult for any refugees to come into the
country.
By extension, it might be rational for policymakers to be very acceptant of false
positives because the public-at-large only holds them accountable for allowing threats to
3

get through. This is because false positives caught up in the screening process
inconvenience a minor fraction of the population and because the wider public rarely
observes these false positives. In a sense, because policymakers feel accountable to the
voting public, but only for those things that severely impact a critical mass of voters, the
democratic accountability system sets up a situation where false positives are tolerated.
This situation persists even if the aggregate cost of the false positives exceeds the costs of
the consequences of extremely rare instances of false negatives. Even explaining signal
detection theory to policymakers is likely not enough to change their behavior.
Along a similar line of thinking, another potential unintended effect of
accountability systems begins to emerge: finding patterns in randomness that do not
actually exist. The case of the London Blitz during World War II is illustrative:
Londoners were convinced that the German Luftwaffe was targeting specific
neighborhoods or strategic sites, when in fact the German bombs were not accurate
enough to do this. A post-war analysis revealed that the bombs essentially fell at random
throughout the city (Clarke, 1946). Other research reveals the human tendency to find
patterns where they do not actually exist (Langer, 1975, 1977; Tune, 1964). Are
accountability systems effective at reducing the tendency for humans to find non-existent
patterns or do they actually lead people to find patterns in randomness?
Politics and Accountability
Accountability is assumed to be a critical component of democratic systems of
governance, yet we do not fully understand the conditions under which these demands
actually lead to improved judgments, decisions, and outcomes. Accountability is
considered an essential feature of democracy because it provides the feedback loop that
4

theoretically improves governance and aligns policymaker choices to public opinion over
time (Bovens, Goodin, & Schillemans, 2014; Cheibub & Przeworski, 1999). Most
politicians and policymakers fear the consequences of failure in a democratic system:
being voted out of office. This self-preservational driver is at the root of decision-making
when it comes to what policies and legislation to support and which ones to reject. Preemptive self-criticism and the additional deliberate thinking that it engenders could
generate improved decision-making (i.e., “will my actions pass the front page of the
Washington Post test?”) (Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999). But it could also generate
sub-optimal choices that appeal only to a narrow band of constituents or bolster
motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990).
Does Accountability Pressure Lead to Politically-Induced Cognitive Closure?
Citizens are interested in ensuring that political leaders are acting in their best
interest, and electoral accountability is the primary lever they can pull to keep politicians
honest. However, the force exerted by accountability pressures actually could be
counterproductive insofar as it pushes political leaders to adopt ideologically-aligned
policies while down-weighting the risks associated with policy implementation.
Elected political leaders and appointed policymakers seek to implement policies
congruent with their political ideology (Dutt & Mitra, 2005; Jost, Federico, & Napier,
2009). These policy choices often involve uncertainty about whether the policy will be
successful. Because the outcomes from enacted policy are uncertain or risky, especially
when the policies, pre-implementation, lack supporting empirical evidence of their
efficacy, political leaders often default to policy preferences consistent with their
ideology (Budge, 1994). However, the linkage between political ideology and policy
5

choice is far from direct, as this relationship is constrained by the accountability
structures present in democracies and attenuated by the uncertainty regarding the net
impact of the policy in question (Przeworski et al., 1999). Psychologically, by attempting
to erase the risk or uncertainty surrounding ideologically-congruent policies, individuals
demonstrate an increased need for cognitive closure (Chirumbolo, Areni, & Sensales,
2004; Jost, 2006; Jost & Amodio, 2012; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost
et al., 2007; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). Accountability pressures, interacting with
ideological beliefs, could exacerbate the need for closure.
Does Accountability Put Pressure on Policymakers to Avoid Blame?
Political actors (e.g., policymakers, pundits, legislators) typically express their
judgments in ambiguous ways with vague verbal probabilities (e.g., likely, more often
than not, possibly). Most recently, intelligence agencies have been criticized for
conveying their assessments in vague verbal probabilities as opposed to more specific
numeric ones (Friedman & Zeckhauser, 2015; Tetlock & Mellers, 2011a). But are these
actors actually behaving rationally?
Precise numeric probabilities hold advantages for account-takers because it leaves
little room for the accountable to wiggle out of evaluations of the accuracy of their
judgments. Conversely, those who are held accountable may feel trapped by numeric
probabilities and would therefore prefer vague verbal probabilities when they are seeking
to avoid accountability. Friedman, Lerner, and Zeckhauser (2017), surveying national
security professionals, found decision-makers were less willing to support risky actions
when those risks were conveyed quantitatively and more willing to seek additional
information to improve their understanding of the situation.

6

Here, accountability pressures might lead to suboptimal outcomes. Citizens’
demands for accountability are like clockwork and policymakers seek to avoid taking the
blame when things go wrong and seek credit when things go right. The public may have
different interpretations of the wisdom of employing vague verbiage or precise
probabilities than politicians, precisely because political actors understand that
accountability means accepting more blame for being precise than being vague.
Can Accountability Help Overcome Cognitive Interference Effects?
People are frequently blindsided by change. Can holding them accountable for
their beliefs make them more sensitive to change? Perceptual interference has received
almost zero attention from judgment and decision-making scholars. Given the robustness
of the other heuristics and biases mentioned earlier, we might expect cognitive
interference effects when people are integrating information that points to incremental
change. Can these cognitive interference effects be overcome with additional deliberate
processing spurred by being held accountable? Scholars have successfully debiased
hindsight effects and status quo bias with strategies such as “considering the opposite”
(Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 1988; Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000). Others
have shown that holding subjects accountable for their judgments has also led to a similar
debiasing effect (Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock & Kim, 1987).
Roadmap
In this dissertation, I set out to study the boundary conditions on accountability
effects. Specifically, in a series of four studies I set out to examine accountability effects
on participants’ performance in highly stochastic and politically-charged environments. I
attempt to answer the following questions: Can accountability spur subjects to distinguish
7

more reliably between highly unpredictable environments and predictable ones, thereby
reducing the incidence of both Type 1 and Type 2 errors? Can holding people
accountable improve their decision-making on politically-charged issues or boost their
accuracy in forecasting geopolitical outcomes? Finally, which individual differences
predict higher performance in different accountability schemes?
Stochastic Settings
In Study 1, subjects were put in charge of defensive emplacements inside a
fictional city divided into quadrants. Choosing the correct quadrant would have
successfully prevented an attack on the city, while choosing the incorrect quadrant led to
a failed defense. Subjects were randomly assigned to complete this task under two
different stochastic conditions. Across these environments, quadrants were targeted for
attack in one of three ways: (a) attacks were distributed at random across all four
quadrants; (b) one quadrant was randomly selected to be targeted 60% of the time, while
the remaining 40% of attacks were distributed randomly across the remaining quadrants;
or (c) one quadrant was randomly selected to be targeted 40% of the time, while the
remaining 60% of attacks were distributed randomly across the remaining quadrants.
Subjects received accurate feedback after each trial and were (a) held accountable for
providing a rationale for their decision strategy (process accountability); (b) held
accountable for the total number of successful defenses (outcome accountability); or (c)
not held accountable at all.
Politically-Charged Settings

8

In Study 2, two sets of subjects were asked about a potential terrorist attack and
its aftermath. The first set of subjects included individuals who previously worked in
public policy at the local, state, or federal level. Subjects received information about a
possible attack and then made a choice of whether to convey that information with either
verbal or numeric probabilities. They were then asked whether they would ground all air
traffic in light of the threat information and how justified they felt in taking action. They
then learned of the outcome of their action and were again asked how justified they felt in
taking action.
A second set of subjects were asked about the same potential terrorist attack. They
judged the performance of policymakers who chose to make their warnings as either
verbal or numeric probabilities. They were then asked to judge policymakers a second
time after learning of the outcomes of the action taken.
In Study 3, subjects were asked to make a value-neutral but politically-charged
public policy choice: whether they would institute a gun control policy, implement an
environmental cleanup plan, or fund a hospital. Subjects were either held accountable for
providing a rationale or were not.
Geopolitical Forecasting and Belief Updating
In Study 4, subjects were asked to make predictions about an upcoming
referendum on state independence, either starting from high information certainty (a
strong prior) or low information certainty (a weak prior). In the first part of this study,
subjects were simply asked to make forecasts. In the second part of this study, subjects
were tested on whether holding them accountable would help them make optimally
Bayesian judgments.
9

CHAPTER 1
Accountability Effects on the Recognition of Randomness and Error Commission
ABSTRACT
Decision errors occur when people take actions that they should not, or fail to take
actions that they should. Errors of the first type – errors of commission – are especially
common in stochastic environments, resulting in volatile decision strategies that “chase”
patterns that do not exist. On the flipside, errors of the second type – errors of omission –
tend to occur when patterns in the environment are both meaningful and valid, but people
fail to recognize them. We examined whether holding subjects accountable for process or
outcome criteria improves performance in environments of varying randomness. Subjects
were asked to choose the correct quadrant to defend on a map of a fictional city, a task
inspired by the London Blitz during World War II. Process accountable subjects were
less likely to make errors of commission in unpredictable environments while outcome
accountable subjects were more likely to commit errors of omission in predictable ones.
Those accountable for process searched for the right solution when it existed, but
continued searching for the right solution even when one did not exist. Process
accountability is not a one-size-fits-all intervention for performance improvement: the
right kind of accountability hinges on recognizing the operational environment in which
the task is situated. Additionally, given the minimalist nature of the accountability
intervention in this study, the effects observed are likely to be the lower-bound on
accountability’s effects on error reduction.
Keywords: process, outcome, accountability, stochastic

10

Introduction
Decision-makers often operate in dynamic environments such as financial
markets, battlefields, and operating rooms (Hastie, 2001). Even though past research has
thoroughly documented the conditions under which decision-makers tend to deviate from
rational utility maximization (Edwards, 1954; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Samuelson &
Zeckhauser, 1988; Simon, 1959), scholars in judgment and decision-making remain at
odds over whether decision-makers are better served by intuitive or deliberate thinking
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1991; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Gigerenzer
& Todd, 1999; Gilovich & Griffin, 2010; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman &
Klein, 2009; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Klein, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
A similar debate exists over what kinds of accountability systems, if any, can
enable higher quality decisions and more accurate judgments. In general, accountability
systems are seen as increasing cognitive demand on subjects and spurring them to use
more deliberate processing when tackling consequential tasks (Patil, Vieider, & Tetlock,
2014). Zooming out, accountability systems, at their core, dictate who must answer to
whom and for what (Frink & Klimoski, 1998, 2004; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).
Accountability has been proposed as a way to improve judgment and decision-making in
many fields, including human resources, education, accounting, corporate governance,
and as a cognitive cure for groupthink (Brennan, Solomon, Brennan, & Solomon, 2008;
Chubb & Moe, 1988; Hall et al., 2003; Kroon, Hart, & Van Kreveld, 1991; Peecher,
Solomon, & Trotman, 2013).
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Holding subjects accountable for their judgments has been shown to reduce
recency bias and overconfidence (Tetlock, 1983b; Tetlock & Kim, 1987), but
accountability can also exacerbate biases if the account takers’ views are known to be
biased (Tetlock, 1992). The distinction between process accountability systems (i.e.,
justifying how you achieved outcomes) and outcome accountability systems (i.e., being
evaluated solely on goal achievement) and the relative merits of the two is a source of
debate (Patil et al., 2014; Pitesa & Thau, 2013). Scholars have examined the question of
whether incentivizing proper thinking or outcomes more reliably improves task
performance (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996; Simonson & Nye, 1992; Simonson & Staw,
1992). Some studies provide evidence to suggest that process accountability is superior
(Ashton, 1992; De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006; Hagafors & Brehmer,
1983), while others demonstrate the negative impact of focusing on outcomes (Arkes,
Dawes, & Christensen, 1986; Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996),
and some show outcome accountability to be superior (Slaughter, Bagger, & Li, 2006).
Antecedent conditions determine when we should expect intuitive judgments to
outperform deliberate thinking or when we should expect to observe no difference in
decision-quality (Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer,
2011). In a similar fashion, the boundary conditions for where and when to expect those
accountable for process to outperform those accountable for outcomes and vice versa can
be determined by the task environment and type (De Langhe, van Osselaer, & Wierenga,
2011). Two central features, one of the decision environment and the other of the
decision task, are likely to impact the effectiveness of process versus outcome
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accountability systems: 1) the predictability of the environment and 2) the cost functions
associated with errors of omission and commission, respectively.
Environmental Validity and Task Predictability
Whether decision-makers can successfully navigate environments with intuition
depends on the predictability of the environment (i.e., cue validity) and opportunities to
learn from regular, meaningful feedback (Arkes, 2001; Goodman, Wood, & Chen, 2011;
Kahneman & Klein, 2009). The degree of environmental randomness faced varies
widely, from low validity environments such as publicly traded equity markets (Malkiel,
1995, 1999; Taleb, 2005) to high validity environments such as piloting and firefighting
(Klein, 2008; Phillips, Klein, & Sieck, 2004). Correctly sizing up the task environment is
central to good judgment. People generally misperceive random processes, including
characterizing random sequences as non-random due to the presence of clusters (people
assume that random sequences will exhibit both local and global randomness) (Hahn &
Warren, 2009; Kahneman & Tversky, 1974; Tune, 1964; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971,
1973) and seeing patterns where they don’t actually exist (Edwards, 1956; Whitson &
Galinsky, 2008). Incorrectly identifying the validity of the task environment can lead to
excessive volatility of judgments and decisions (Bondt & Thaler, 1985; De Bondt &
Thaler, 1994; Odean, 1998) and inadequate calibration (both over-confidence and underconfidence) (Massey & Wu, 2005).
How can accountability systems help people navigate these task environments?
The recommendations from the literature paint a complicated picture. Some researchers
have found that intuitive processing led to superior performance even in a task
environment with very complex variable relationships (Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Hoffman,
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1987; Lewicki, Hill, & Bizot, 1988; Lewicki, Hill, & Czyzewska, 1992). Other
researchers have found that intuition leads to flawed judgments, such as imperfectly
assessing covariation (Arkes, 1981, 1991; Arkes et al., 1986).
One way forward can be found in the work of De Langhe et al. (2011) who found
that process accountability enabled higher quality judgments when the task was elemental
– that is, when the cue-outcome relationship was linear (additive). In elemental tasks,
properly attending to the individual cues would result in a more accurate judgment.
However, when the task was configural – that is, when the cue-outcome structure is
interactive (multiplicative) – those in the outcome accountability condition were more
accurate. It follows that in high validity environments, attending to the task specifics is
likely to lead to more accurate judgments as people are more quickly to be able to pick up
on the real patterns that exist in the environment. Depending on the how the system is set
up, process accountability can push subjects to focus attention on specifics (or concrete
processing), as opposed to outcome accountability, which typically enable holistic
assessments (or abstract processing) (Trope & Liberman, 2003).
However, depending on environmental validity, more specific thinking is not
always helpful. In low validity environments, activating deliberate modes of thought can
lead to excessive search for non-existent patterns, reading meaning into meaningless
patterns such as in the “hot hand” fallacy, misperception of otherwise random processes
such as the “illusion of control,” and decisional deliberation beyond the point of
diminishing returns (Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985; Langer, 1975, 1977; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1971). Decisions in stochastic environments may be systematically biased,
as some researchers have demonstrated a tendency to use short-run contrarian strategies
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(i.e., believing the next event must be different from the last) when randomness is
perceived to be high (Tyszka, Zielonka, Dacey, & Sawicki, 2008) or investing too much
or too little as compared to the predictions of the utility maximization model (Bostian,
Holt, & Smith, 2008; Schweitzer & Cachon, 2000).
Accountability Dictates Exist on a Specificity Continuum
How specific or ambiguous should agents expect accountability rules to be? The
dictates of process and outcome accountability systems vary from highly ambiguous to
highly specific in a manner similar to the validity of the environments in which they are
designed to operate (Bovens et al., 2014). Ultimately, the level of specificity in an
accountability system is likely correlated with the regularity of the task environment. At
one end, satisfying accountability system dictates may require fulfilling very specific
criteria, and on the other end, ambiguous criteria. In an orderly and linear environment,
systemic behavior can be understood to the point that a derived process optimally
describes what is going on within the system. Outperforming a well-crafted process
accountability regime in this environment becomes impossible.
However, volatile environments are precisely the kind of environment where
high-stakes decisions are made. Decision-makers, such as military officers during
wartime or officials in charge of monetary policy during financial crises, often find
themselves in chaotic environments where the right answer isn’t known and an exact
decision process cannot be specified. In this case, the means of achieving improved
performance is ambiguous and decision-makers can only be offered a few specific
(inexact) process guidelines. The rest must be improved or left to the discretion of the
individual decision-maker. And in extreme cases, process accountability systems may
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include no specific process guidelines at all, just guidance that you should use your best
judgment and be ready to explain that process later. Similarly, outcome accountability
dictates can be well-defined or ambiguous. Outcome goals could include specific goals to
work towards, or ill-defined goals exemplified by the generic phrases “be successful” and
“do your best”.
Error-Balancing, Error Aversion, and Differing Predictions for Outcome and Process
Accountability
Drawing on logical insights from signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966),
a feature of decision-making in non-deterministic environments is that errors are dualsided, in that they can result from both omission and commission. Whether mistakes
arising from not taking an action versus taking an action are worse depends on the
associated cost-functions, although the psychological literature points to a distinct
omission bias where people favor mistakes from not taking an action over those that arise
from taking one (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Ritov & Baron, 1990, 1995). The literature on
error-balancing is underdeveloped and the question of whether accountability systems
can experimentally enable balancing behavior is unexplored, especially within the
context of unpredictable vs. predictable environments (Camerer, 1987; Hollnagel, 2000;
Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991).
When should we expect over-commitment to failed decision strategies or undercommitment to promising ones? In general, we should expect systematic risk avoidance
(and thus under-commitment and excessively shifting strategies) in unpredictable
environments rooted in ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg, 1961). However, this general risk
avoidance may not hold, to the extent that specific kinds of accountability systems can
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lead subjects to erroneously think that the environment is more or less predictable than in
reality. For example, depending on how the system is set up, process accountability can
lead to excessive focus on task sub-components, which can impair recognition of a low
validity environment and thus set up pathways to errors of commission (overcommitment). Outcome accountability can lead to inadequate attention to variable
relationships in high validity environments, leading to errors of omission (undercommitment).
Previous work showed that process accountability tended to increase vigilance in
information processing and selection of the most defensible decision strategy (Tetlock,
1983a, 1985; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989; Zhang & Mittal, 2005). Thus, process
accountability should push subjects to search more attentively for the right solution when
it exists. Other streams of research, conducted by de Langhe and colleagues (2011), show
that process accountability increases epistemic motivation (search for answers or truth),
which promotes effortful information processing The result is a more consistent approach
to making decisions and choices—something that is beneficial when patterns in the
environment are consistent.
However, the risk here is that process accountable subjects continue the search
long after it has proven to be fruitless—no proper decision rule exists for totally random
environments—thereby leading to errors of commission. Past work has shown that
process accountability leads to more information processing, including consideration of
irrelevant evidence (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1995). Per Patil et al. (2016), the decision
rule was inadequate in the excessive conformity risk condition, which led to process
accountability degrading task performance. While the task was more predictable, there
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existed better decision rules to get to the right answer, which subjects didn’t seek out.
Previous work has also shown that process accountability tends to lead to higher levels of
conformity to existing decision rules and systems, weighing information in a rule-based
fashion (Chang et al., 2017; de Langhe et al., 2011). Similarly, in a low validity
environment – that is, navigating a more difficult task environment – we should expect
process to degrade performance because no amount of rule-seeking will get the subject
closer to the right answer. The previously beneficial conformity to adequate rules thus
becomes a detrimental kind of judgmental consistency (Chang et al., 2017). Thus, it
follows that:
Hypothesis 1a: Process accountability degrades task performance in low validity
environments but improves performance in high validity ones, when compared to
no accountability and outcome accountability.
A flipside risk exists for outcome accountable subjects whose attentional focus is
on their final score. Previous work has shown that outcome accountable subjects were
less likely to use consistent rules for their choices and decisions, likely due to a focus on
the end results as opposed to how to get to the end result (de Langhe et al., 2011).
Certainly, a focus on outcomes could lead to behavior to maximize scores when an
adequate decision rule exists. Thus, in a high validity environment, where the task is
more predictable, outcome accountable subjects should identify a real pattern more
quickly. However, these subjects may still be tempted to continue searching for patterns
that do not exist. Because outcome accountability tends to generate “deviation” errors,
that is, resisting to conform to previously discovered adequate decision processes, we
would expect these subjects to chase a higher score even when being more conservative
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would be a better course of action (Patil et al., 2016; Chang et al., 2017). Conversely,
outcome accountable subjects concerned about scores would likely be more protective of
them in a random world, thus reducing the risk of commission errors in low validity
environments. By focusing on the score and noticing that no amount of switching or
searching for a pattern is helping to increase it, outcome accountability might help
subjects recognize randomness more quickly. Thus, it follows that:
Hypothesis 2a: Outcome accountability degrades performance in high validity
environments but enhances performance in low validity ones, when compared to
no accountability and process accountability.
The concept of psychological safety also potentially illuminates the relationship
between accountability systems and error propensities (Edmondson, 1999, 2002).
Psychological safety is the degree to which people perceive their environment as enabling
interpersonal risk-taking (Edmondson, Kramer, & Cook, 2004). Process accountability
guidelines can feel psychologically safe in low validity environments because at least it
feels possible to satisfy the requirements of the process system (as it is difficult to
perform well in low validity environments). Outcome accountability in low validity
environments can be viewed as arbitrary and capricious, as the level of effort expended is
not tightly coupled with achieving better outcomes. We should expect more errors of
commission by process accountable subjects in low validity environments, as they may
also feel psychologically safer to take action because process inputs are controllable.
Thus, it follows that:
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Hypothesis 1b: Process-accountable subjects are more likely to make errors of
commission in low validity environments but not in high validity ones, when
compared to non-accountable and outcome accountable subjects.

Hypothesis 2b: Outcome-accountable subjects are more likely to make errors of
commission in high validity environments but not in low validity ones, when
compared to non-accountable and process accountable subjects.

Hypothesis 3: Both errors of omission and commission are negatively related to
task performance.

Accountability, Learning, and Regulatory Focus
What else drives the differences in performance between outcome accountable
and process accountable agents? Results from a large-scale year-long field experiment
examining accountability and learning found evidence to support outcome accountability
as being more conducive to long-term learning and process accountability as less so
(Chang et. al., 2017). Following March’s (1991) distinction between exploration and
exploitation, the results of previous research show that learning within process
accountability led to improvements in execution of the process, while learning within
outcome accountability led to improved overall performance beyond the process baseline.
Focusing on learning specifically helps us better understand the relationship between
learning and accountability in highly predictable vs. low predictability task environments,
and also whether subjects are better able to balance error propensities over time. This has
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been similarly investigated within the multiple-cue probability learning experimental
paradigm (although the current experiment differs in that it has only one cue) (Hammond
& Summers, 1965; Hammond, Summers, & Deane, 1973; Hursch, Hammond, & Hursch,
1964).
Another body of literature that illuminates how this learning potentially occurs is
the work on regulatory focus, which builds on the aforementioned work on psychological
safety (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Process accountable agents, adopting a prevention
mindset, are less likely to identify environmental randomness because they are fully
engaged in process execution. Thus, over time, process accountable agents are unlikely to
transcend the limitations of the process for which they are responsible and will be slower
to identify that the environment in which they are operating is not suitable for blindly
following process dictates. In contrast, outcome accountable agents, for which the nature
of the effort-outcome coupling is front and center, will likely adopt a promotion-focused
mindset, and are more likely to quickly understand the extent to which environmental
randomness influences preferred outcomes. Thus, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4: Outcome accountable agents will learn to commit fewer errors of
commission in low validity environments and process accountable agents will
learn to commit fewer errors of omission in high validity environments.
Figure 1 depicts the full moderated-mediation model for this study.

21

Figure 1. Model of how error propensity and environmental validity moderate
accountability effects on task performance. The predictability of the task environment
moderates the effects of accountability on task performance.

Method
Optimal Strategies for Solving the Task “London Quadrants”
In a series of studies, subjects completed a custom-designed task (referred to as
“London Quadrants”) inspired by the London Blitz of World War II when Nazi Germany
attempted to force the United Kingdom to capitulate by attacking population centers. A
case study after the war revealed that many of the reported actions taken by British
citizens—who naturally assumed the Germans were purposefully targeting parts of the
city—turned out to be overreactions to randomness. The German Luftwaffe aircraft were
simply targeting the center of London, not specific landmarks (Clarke, 1946).
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Subjects received instructions for how to complete the task and then were shown
a map of the fictional city, Lemon, split into quadrants. They were told that their task was
to defend the city from the country of Grapes by correctly predicting which quadrant was
going to be targeted next. A correct prediction would negate an attack from the Grape air
force. For more screenshots, see the Methodological Appendix.1 Following task
completion, subjects answered a survey which captured the following individual
differences variables: actively open-minded thinking, need for cognition, and the Big 5
factors (conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness to experiences, extroversion, and
agreeableness). See the Methodological Appendix for the full scales used.

Figure 2. Map of city of Lemon in the London Quadrants task. Subjects saw a version of
a fictional city named Lemon attacked by the country of Grapes.
Tracking Task Performance
Subjects were then instructed in how their performance on the London Quadrants
task would be scored. Subjects were asked to make predictions for 60 trials. If they
1

Game located at: www.gjptraining.org/sona/game/start, see the methodological appendix for screenshots;
http://lemon-game.herokuapp.com/
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successfully defended a quadrant via a correct prediction, they would be awarded points.
If they were unsuccessful, points would be deducted. Once they chose a quadrant to
defend, switching to another quadrant on a subsequent trial would incur a cost. Event
point values were as follows: Successful Defense (S) = +2; Unsuccessful Defense (U) =
-1; Cost of Switching (CoS) = -0.5. Assuming no switches, subjects could achieve a
maximum possible score of 120; assuming maximal switching and unsuccessful
defensive emplacements, subjects could achieve the worst possible score of -90.

Table 1
Possible Scores on London Quadrants Task
Scenario
Best outcome (100% success) | no switching
Best outcome | switching 50% of the time
Best outcome | switching 100% of the time
Worst outcome (0% success) | switching 50% of the time
Worst outcome | switching 100% of the time

Total score
60*(2) = 120
60*(2) – 30*(-0.5) = 105
60*(2) – 60*(-0.5) = 90
60(-1) – 30*(-0.5) = -75
60(-0.5) + -1*(60) = -90

A normatively-justified strategy for choosing which quadrant to defend is arrived
at by calculating the expected value of each action on each trial, and selecting the action
with the highest expected value. The challenge is that subjects do not know the
probabilities that are required to make the expected value calculation. Thus, as part of this
process, an optimal strategy in the London Quadrants task would require subjects to
derive the probabilities of a successful defense in each quadrant via Bayesian inference.
Once the expected values of defending each quadrant are known, a player’s optimal
strategy is determined by the balance of costs and benefits associated with implementing
each plausible defense. Choosing to switch requires that the expected value of switching
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be greater than the expected value of staying in the same quadrant and vice versa for
staying in the same quadrant.
Thus, a player should choose to switch quadrants if and only if the expected value
of switching is greater than the expected value of remaining in the same quadrant as the
previous trial: 2𝑝 𝑆|𝑥& = 𝑥&() − 𝑝 𝑈|𝑥& = 𝑥&() + 𝑆𝐶 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥 2𝑝 𝑆|𝑥& ≠ 𝑥&() −
𝑝 𝑈|𝑥& ≠ 𝑥&() ,
Where x = (1,2,3,4) represents the quadrant in which a subject has stationed his or her
defense on trial i.
Or more simply: max(EV | Switch) + Cost(Switch) > EV | No Switch
Coming Up With A Generally Successful Strategy
Let 𝑡& be a random variable that represents the change in score in trial 𝑖, and let T
be a random variable representing the total score of a participant for the entirety of the
game.
67

𝑇=

𝑡&
&8)

For a random variable 𝑋, we let 𝐸 𝑋 represent its expected value, 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑋 = [𝜎 𝑋 ]@
represent its variance, and 𝜎(𝑋) represent its standard deviation. We further let 𝑃(𝑆& |𝐺)
represent the probability that trial 𝑖 generates a success (𝑆& ), given a participant uses
strategy 𝐺.
Ignoring switching costs, the expected value of 𝑡& given strategy 𝐺 is as follows:
𝐸 𝑡& = 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 2 + 1 − 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ −1
= 3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1
)
Thus, the expected value of a given trial is positive if 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 > .
H
Again ignoring switching costs, the variance of 𝑡& is given by:
𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑡& = 𝐸 𝑡&@ − 𝐸 𝑡& @
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= 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 4 + 1 − 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 1 − 3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1 @
= 3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 + 1 − 9𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 @ + 6𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1
@
= 9 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺
+ 6 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 + 4 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺
= 9𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 9𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 @
However, if the quadrant chosen in trial 𝑖 is different from the quadrant in trial 𝑖 − 1 for
all i, then the participant also loses points for switching:
𝐸 𝑡& = 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ (1.5) + 1 − 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺
= 3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1.5

∗ −1.5

The variance of 𝑡& , given switching on all trials, is:
𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑡& = 𝐸 𝑡&@ − 𝐸 𝑡& @
= 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 2.25 + 1 − 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 2.25 − 3 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1.5
= 2.25 − 9𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 @ + 6𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 2.25
= 6𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 9𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 @

@

What if the attacks are randomly distributed amongst quadrants?
When the environment is random (i.e., each quadrant has the same probability of being
)

attacked), no matter what the strategy is, 𝑃 𝑆& 𝐺) = . So, it follows that the expected
N

value, given no switching, is:
1
𝐸 𝑡& = 3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1 = − = −0.25
4
The variance, given no switching, is:
𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑡& = 𝐸 𝑡&@ − 𝐸 𝑡& @
= 9𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 9𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 @
36
9
27
=
−
=
= 1.69
16
16 16
Given switching, the expected value is:
3
𝐸 𝑡& = 3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1.5 = − = −0.75
4
The variance, given a switch, is:
𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑡& = 𝐸 𝑡&@ − 𝐸 𝑡& @
= 𝑃 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 2.25 + 1 − 𝑃 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 2.25 − 3 𝑃 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1.5
= 6𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 9𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 @
26

@

=

24
9
15
−
=
= 0.9375
16 16
16

Over the entire length of the task, the best strategy (G) in a random environment, is
simply to pick a quadrant and stick to it, because other strategies incur switching costs
while getting no higher chances of success. So, we will restrict our attention to this case.
The expected score using the no-switch strategy is:
67

𝐸[𝑡] = 𝐸[

𝑡& ]
&8)

67

=

𝐸 𝑡&
&8)

= 60 ∗ 𝐸 𝑡&
= −15
The variance and standard deviation are:
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𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑇) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟[
&8)

67

=

𝑡& ]

𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑡&
&8)

= 60 ∗ 1.69
405
=
= 101.25
4
𝜎 𝑇 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑡
= 10.06
We can approximate the score distribution using a normal random variable with expected
value of −15 and standard deviation 10.06.
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Figure 3. Expected total score distribution in a random environment. Expected scores for
a subject choosing one quadrant at random and not switching out of that quadrant.

What if the attacks are not randomly distributed?
What is the optimal strategy if the attacks are not randomly distributed? There are
many ways in which the quadrants can be targeted, but in a non-random scenario, one or
more quadrants will be targeted at rates higher than chance. In the case where a higherweighted quadrant has a probability of being targeted p = 0.6, and the remaining
quadrants are independently targeted with a cumulative probability of p = 0.4 (i.e., 40%
of the time, one of the three lower-weighted quadrants is targeted at random), the
expected value of protecting the higher-weighted quadrant is:
𝐸 𝑡& = 3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1
= 0.8
The expected value of choosing one of the lower-weighted quadrants is thus:
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𝐸 𝑡& = 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 2 + 1 − 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺
= 3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1
9
=−
= −0.6
15

∗ −1

Likewise, the expected value of switching to the higher-weighted (i.e., the normatively
correct) quadrant is:
𝐸 𝑡& = 𝑃 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 1.5 + 1 − 𝑃 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ −1.5
= 3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1.5
= 0.3
Finally, the expected value of switching to one of the lower-weighted quadrants is:
𝐸 𝑡& = 𝑃 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 1.5 + 1 − 𝑃 𝑆& 𝐺
= 3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1.5
= −1.1

∗ −1.5

What strategy should be employed over the course of the task in a non-random
environment?
The most straightforward strategy for maximizing the total score is to switch to
the most frequently targeted quadrant and stay there. Even so, the “choose one quadrant
and never switch” strategy still has the expected value:
67

𝐸[𝑡] = 𝐸[

𝑡& ]
&8)

= 0.25 ∗ 60 ∗ 0.8 + 0.75 ∗ 60 ∗ −0.6
= −15
In this strategy, the variance of total score is significantly higher – either you
initially choose the higher-weighted quadrant or you do not.
Strategies from reinforcement learning
The LQ task can be framed as a reinforcement learning problem (e.g., a multiarmed bandit). Bandit problems model an agent simultaneously trying to acquire new
knowledge (exploration) while optimizing decisions based on existing knowledge
(exploitation). The agent attempts to balance these competing priorities to maximize the
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total value attained over time. On each trial 𝑖 ∈ 1, 2, … , 60 , the player can take one of
four actions (e.g., choosing to protect one of the four quadrants). To review, if the player
chooses the same quadrant as they did in the previous trial (or if 𝑖 = 1), then they receive
+2 if that quadrant is attacked, and receive -1 if another quadrant is attacked. If they
switch to another quadrant, they get a reward of 1.5 if the chosen quadrant is attacked and
receive -1.5 otherwise. In the language of reinforcement learning, the goal is to maximize
the sum of all the rewards over time received by the agent. On trial 𝑖, suppose the player
has seen 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&() strikes against quadrants 1, 2, 3, 4 respectively, where
𝑎&() + 𝑏&() + 𝑐&() + 𝑑&() = 𝑖 − 1. Also suppose the player is at quadrant 𝑞&() . This
state can be represented by a quintet 𝑞&() , 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&() . Assuming the attacked
quadrants are independent given the true generating distribution, no further knowledge
can be gained from the specific order of attacks, and this state contains all the information
needed to make a choice regarding the next trial.
Without any loss of generality, suppose the agent is currently in quadrant 1. The
value (that is, the expected value over the remaining rounds) of staying is:

𝐸 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 1 1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&()
= 𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 1 (1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&() )) ∗ 2
+ 𝑝(𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 2 1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&() 𝐸 1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() + 1, 𝑐&() , 𝑑&()
−1
+ 𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 3 1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&() 𝐸 1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() + 1, 𝑑&()
−1
+ 𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 4 1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&() (𝐸 1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&() + 1
− 1)

Likewise, the value of choosing quadrant 2 can be calculated as:
𝐸 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 2 1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&()
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= 𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 2
+ 1.5
+ 𝑝(𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 1
− 1.5
+ 𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 3
− 1.5
+ 𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 4
− 1.5)

(1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&() )) ∗ 𝐸( 1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&()
1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&()

𝐸 1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() + 1, 𝑐&() , 𝑑&()

1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&()

𝐸 1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() + 1, 𝑑&()

1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&() (𝐸 1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&() + 1

The value of choosing quadrants 3 and 4 can be calculated similarly. Since the agent is
trying to choose so as to maximize value, they will take the quadrant that has the highest
value. This means the value of 1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&() is given by:
𝑉 1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&() = max 𝑉(𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑞 | 1, 𝑎&() , 𝑏&() , 𝑐&() , 𝑑&() )
e

Note that the value of all trials where 𝑡 > 60 is 0, because the game is over, and that the
value of any state at time 𝑡 depends only on the value of states at time 𝑡 + 1. To review,
the total value across trials is:
g867

𝑅=

𝑟𝑡
h8)

Thus, the expected total reward from following strategy G is
𝐸 𝑅(𝐺, 𝑋) =

h

2 ∗ 𝑝( 𝑋h = 𝐴h ) − 𝑝 𝑋h ≠ 𝐴h − 0.5 ∗ (𝐴h ≠ 𝐴h )

Table 2
Reinforcement Learning Model Derived Optimal Behavior in London Quadrants Task
Scenario
Model
Optimal Behavior
𝐸 𝑅(𝐺, 𝑋)
1
pi = 0.25, i = 1,2,3,4
Choose any
-15
quadrant and do not
move
2
p1 = 0.6, pi =
Choose quadrant i =
78
(0.4/3), 1,2,3,4
1 and do not move
3
p1 = 0.4, pi =
Choose quadrant i =
48
(0.6/3), 1,2,3,4
1 and do not move
The probabilities involved can be calculated directly using Bayesian reasoning. This
means we can work backwards from 𝑡 = 60 and explicitly calculate the value of each
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state, as well as the value of choosing a given action given a state. Then, we can choose
the action at each step that maximizes expected value. However, this behavior is only
possible if the agent knows the model (i.e., the true distribution of attacks).
What if the distribution of attacks is unknown?
If model (pi , i = 1, 2, 3, 4) is unknown, what would constitute optimal behavior (i.e.,
how should subjects behave in the experiment)? Learning the model (pi , i = 1, 2, 3, 4)
given a history of outcomes (e.g., successes and predictions), ht = (a1, x1, a2, x1, …, at, xt)
where (x1, …, xt) is a sample from model (pi) can be defined as:
h

𝑍&h

=

𝐼(𝑥𝑗 = 𝑖) , 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4
m8)

the number of attacks observed in quadrant i after t trials

where

𝑍&h = 𝑍)h , 𝑍@h , 𝑍Hh , 𝑍Nh ~ 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑡m 𝑝) 𝑝@ 𝑝H 𝑝N )
N

𝑧&h = 𝑡
&8)

The challenge for subjects is to determine the distribution of probabilities across the
quadrants (𝑝) 𝑝@ 𝑝H 𝑝N ). As previously noted, the probabilities can be calculated via
Bayesian inference, which gives rise to the optimal way of approaching LQ. The
Bayesian inference model allows us to simplify the problem into a two-choice model:
stay or switch. We can thus calculate the Value of Switching (VoS) and derive an optimal
solution by calculating when VoS is > or < the value of choosing the same quadrant.
VoS = 𝐸 𝑅(𝐺 & , 𝑋) − 𝐸 𝑅(𝐺 & , 𝑋)
If VoS > 0.5 à at+1 = j
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Now, let a successful trial be defined as S and an unsuccessful trial be defined as U,
switching quadrants designated as Sw and staying as St. Thus:
1.5*P(S|Sw) - 1.5*P(U|Sw) > 2*P(S|St) - P(U|St)
This Bayesian model simplifies to:
= 1.5*P(S|Sw) - 1.5*(1-P(U|Sw)) > 2*P(S|St) - (1-P(S|St))
= 1.5(2*P(S|Sw) - 1) > 3*P(S|St) - 1
= 3*P(S|Sw) - 1.5 > 3*P(S|Sw) - 1
= 3*P(S|Sw) - 3*P(S|St) > 0.5
= P(S|Sw) - P(S|St) > 1/6

Bayesian Model for Switching or Staying
1.00
0.80

Value of Switching

0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
0.00
-0.20

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

0.70

0.80

0.90

1.00

-0.40
-0.60
-0.80
-1.00

p(Success|Switch)

Figure 4. Graph depicting when subjects should stay or switch according to Bayes
Theorem. The red line depicts when the value of switching is equal to 0.167 and the blue
line represents the probability of a successful defense given a switch.

Figure 4 shows that a subject should switch quadrants when the probability of success is
greater than 0.58 and stay if the probability is less than that.
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The Bayesian model justifies the following strategy:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Start by randomly choosing a quadrant
Identify which quadrant, if any, is the best one to protect
Infer a rule, if any, for how quadrants are attacked
Switch to that quadrant if the probability of that quadrant being hit is more than
58%
5. If you cannot identify the higher-weighted quadrant (or if there is none), then stay
with the quadrant you are currently in.
Beyond taking into account simple expected value calculations, there are several
potential normative strategies that can be employed to perform well on the LQ task,
depending on certain assumptions regarding the distribution of attacks and the
independence or dependence of events from trial-to-trial. For example, Figures 5 and 6
depict dependent models, where the last attacked quadrant determines the next attacked
quadrant.

London Quadrants Conditional Model
PAA

PBA

A

PBB

B

PAB
PBC

PAC

PCA

PBC

PAD

PBD

PDB

PCB
PCC

C

PCD

D

PDD

PDC

Figure 5. London Quadrants general conditional model. Future attacks could be
determined by what happened immediately before.
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London Quadrants (Deterministic) Conditional Model
PAA

PBA

A

PBB

B

PAB
PBC

PAC

PCA

PBC

PAD

PBD

PDB

PCB
PCC

C

PCD

D

PDD

PDC

Figure 6. London Quadrants specific conditional model. In this case, if quadrant A was
attacked first, then the order of subsequent attacks is B, C, D and then back to A.
There are a large number of potential conditional models. The above models were
highlighted to show two possibilities—but it is outside the scope of this experiment to
enumerate all of the possible alternative strategies, given assumptions of conditionality.
For the purposes of the experiment, the Bayesian inference model is the optimal model
given an assumption of independence (subjects were not told of any normative
information or of a model to follow).

Procedure and Subjects
The study was conducted in two parts. Both experiments, 1a and 1b, were 2
(random vs. non-random environment) x 3 (no accountability, process accountability,
outcome accountability) factorial design. Subjects were randomly assigned one of the six
conditions. In Experiment 1a (N=178), subjects were recruited by a university behavioral
lab and consisted mostly of undergraduates and some community members. Over 90% of
the subjects were between the ages of 18-24. The sample was 66% female and 40%
35

Caucasian. In Experiment 1b (N=106), subjects were also recruited by the university
behavioral lab. Over 97% of subjects were between the ages of 18-24. The sample was
56% female and 57% Caucasian.

Materials
Subjects utilized a custom-designed web interface to complete the task. Each
subject completed the task of choosing the correct quadrant over sixty trials after
receiving a thorough set of instructions. In the random condition, each quadrant had an
equal chance of being attacked on each trial. In the non-random condition, one quadrant
was randomly selected to be the higher weighted quadrant, which meant that it had an
increased likelihood of being attacked. In all cases, the complementary cumulative
probability was allocated to the remaining quadrants such that each of the remaining
quadrants had an equal probability of being attacked. In Experiment 1a, the higherweighted quadrant was attacked 60% of the time, with the remaining quadrants being
randomly targeted the remaining 40% of the time. In Experiment 1b, the higher-weighted
quadrant was attacked 40% of the time, with the remaining quadrants being randomly
targeted the remaining 60% of the time. To review, subjects received 2 points for
correctly choosing which quadrant was going to be attacked next, -1 point for
unsuccessful choices, and switching quadrants cost subjects 0.5 point. Subjects were
assigned to one of three accountability conditions: no accountability, process
accountability, and outcome accountability. Depending on the condition they were
assigned to, subjects saw the following language to describe the need to justify their
choice of quadrants.
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Table 3
Accountability Manipulation Descriptions for Experiments
Condition
Manipulation Language
Control
“Please do the best that you can. You will have the opportunity to take
notes and put your notes into a text box. You will not be evaluated on
your final score nor on the reasoning that you put in the text box. The
notes are for your benefit only. Your full completion of the task and
subsequent survey is the only requirement for this study.”
Process

“You will be evaluated based upon your rationale for how you made
the decision to protect each quadrant. Before you make a decision
regarding the quadrant to protect on each trial, you must write your
rationale for the decision in the provided text box. An expert evaluator
trained by the experimental staff will award you points for each of
your explanations. You will be evaluated on the quality of your
explanations only. Your final score will not impact your compensation
at all. You will be awarded a bonus of up to $12 for the quality of your
explanations.”

Outcome

“You will be evaluated solely on your final score. Your goal is to
achieve the highest positive score possible. Your score will determine
how much bonus compensation you receive. For each point you score,
you will be awarded $0.10 for a total possible bonus payout of $12.
You can take notes in the provided text box. Your notes will NOT be
read by the experimenter. The notes are for your benefit only.”

Results
Experiment 1a
Subjects in Experiment 1a experienced completely random targeting of quadrants,
or one quadrant targeted 60% of the time and the remaining 40% of attacks randomly
distributed amongst the remaining three quadrants. We first sought to determine whether
there were significant differences in scores between accountability and validity
conditions.
The results from Experiment 1a, specifically final scores and frequency of
switches, were consistent with the predicted direction of effects per Hypotheses1a, 1b,
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2a, and 2b; however, the differences between conditions were not significant. Table 4
shows that process accountability improved performance in the non-random (high
validity) condition, compared to all random (low validity) conditions. Both process and
outcome accountability reduced errors of commission in random environments. Being
held accountable, in any form, generally reduced errors of commission in the non-random
environment, as subjects found the higher-weighted quadrant earlier and continued to
protect the quadrant from attack, improving their overall performance while not making
mistakes. Figure 7 and Table 6 show how performance diverged during the experiment.
ANOVA of accountability and validity showed those in the non-random environment
outperforming those in the random environment F(1, 23507) = 37.1, p <.001.
Environmental validity was the primary driver of results in Experiment 1a.
Table 4
Average Scores by Condition for Experiment 1a
Mean
Condition
n
Score
Random Not Accountable
43
-16.66
Random Outcome
38
-18.62
Random Process
27
-15.41
60/40
Not Accountable
25
2.94
60/40
Outcome
23
6.93
60/40
Process
22
11.05

38

SD
22.86
24.20
19.89
28.21
30.41
27.27

SE
3.49
3.93
3.83
5.64
6.34
5.81

Table 5
Average Switches by Condition for Experiment 1a
Mean
Condition
n
Switches
Random Not Accountable
43
25.81
Random Outcome
38
22.47
Random Process
27
22.41
60/40
Not Accountable
25
21.24
60/40
Outcome
23
15.74
60/40
Process
22
15.55

SD
15.85
14.60
15.64
13.09
10.15
13.63

SE
2.42
2.37
3.01
2.62
2.12
2.91

Figure 7. Average condition scores across trials in Experiment 1a (random / 60 – 40).
Average scores within conditions diverge based on the level of environmental
randomness encountered. Shaded area represents standard error of the mean.
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Table 6
ANOVA of Environmental Validity on Average Score

Environmental Validity

df

SS

MS

F

Pr(>F)

1

24133

24133

38.64

<0.001***

***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05

How close do subjects in Experiment 1a get to matching the results predicted by
perfectly random moves or an optimally Bayesian approach? Figures 8 and 9 show the
subject performance compared to randomly switching and staying (a normal distribution
around a score of -15) and performing as an optimal Bayesian (a normal distribution
around a score of 78). Those in the random conditions performed close to the expected
results, while those who faced non-random environments under accountability, especially
those under process pressures, performed between the perfectly random and perfectly
Bayesian. We explore this further in Experiment 1b.
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Figure 8. Overall score distribution in Experiment 1a by condition. The score
distribution for choosing at random is depicted in orange (simulated results from 10,000
games) and the score distribution of an optimal Bayesian in a non-random world is
depicted in black (simulated results from 10,000 games).
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Figure 9. Score distribution in Experiment 1a by condition. Random conditions are in the
top row and non-random ones are in the bottom row. Not accountable subjects who faced
a random environment (depicted in blue) performed in a manner close to choosing at
random (depicted in orange). Process accountable subjects who faced a non-random
environment (depicted in dark red) performed better than randomly choosing quadrants,
but not as well as an optimal Bayesian.
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Experiment 1b
Results
While the results of Experiment 1a were inconclusive, the direction of effects was
mostly consistent with the initial hypotheses. In Experiment 1b, we decreased the
percentage of the time the higher-weighted quadrant was targeted in the non-random
condition (from 60% to 40%), dropping it below the expected value threshold for
switching. Subjects (N=106) in Experiment 1b experienced completely random targeting
of quadrants, or one quadrant targeted 40% of the time and the remaining 60% randomly
distributed amongst the remaining three quadrants.
We again sought to see if accountability led to differences in subjects’ final
scores. Process accountability led to performance worse than both the control and
outcome accountability in the random environment, but process improved performance
above both the control and outcome accountability in the non-random environment.
Outcome accountability degraded performance in the non-random environment compared
to controls and process accountability, while outcome accountable subjects outperformed
process ones in the random environment. These results are wholly consistent with
Hypotheses 1a and 1b and partially support Hypotheses 2a and 2b. The performance
differences between outcome and not accountable subjects was not significant.
Table 7 displays the final scores of subjects in the task and effects of varying
accountability and environmental validity. Varying environmental validity for
accountable subjects led to a significant effect on performance scores (d = .35) when
compared to the not accountable subjects. While process accountable subjects had the
highest average scores in the non-random environment (M = 35.5, SD = 29.5), they
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simultaneously registered the worst performance in the random environment (M = -17.5,
SD = 20.6). Being held accountable for outcomes led to worse performance compared to
not being held accountable in both the random and non-random conditions, although the
differences were not significant. Table 8 shows the total times subjects switched
quadrants during the experiment. Outcome accountable subjects under random conditions
switched quadrants the most (M = 25.3, SD = 15.0) while process accountable subjects
working under similar random conditions followed closely behind (M = 21.1, SD = 11.4).
Notably, process accountable subjects in the non-random condition had the least number
of switches (M = 8.0, SD = 5.1), registering a large effect (d = -1.02) over the control.

Table 7
Average Scores by Condition in Experiment 1b
Mean
Condition
n
Score
Random Not Accountable
17
-7.15
Random Outcome
31
-10.32
Random Process
18
-17.52
40-60
Not Accountable
14
5.29
40-60
Outcome
15
1.27
40-60
Process
11
35.54

SD
37.20
28.09
20.63
32.72
25.40
29.55

SE
9.02
5.04
4.86
8.75
6.56
8.91

Cohen’s
d
-0.10
-0.34
0.35
0.26
1.24

Table 8
Average Switches by Condition in Experiment 1b
Mean
Condition
n Switches
Random Not Accountable
17
19.94
Random Outcome
31
21.06
Random Process
18
25.29
40-60
Not Accountable
14
16.86
40-60
Outcome
15
21.07
40-60
Process
11
8.00
44

SD
14.31
14.98
11.42
16.02
13.22
5.10

SE
3.47
2.69
2.69
4.28
3.41
1.54

Cohen’s
d
0.08
0.36
-0.20
0.08
-1.02

To what extent does increased deliberative information processing explain the
differences in final scores? Accountability manipulations overall increased the total
number of rationales provided by subjects, as well as length of those rationales, compared
to not accountable subjects. Table 9 shows the large effect that process accountability had
on both providing a rationale (M = 13.17 and 17.64) and the average length of those
rationales in characters (M = 37.02 and 36.57). These differences were consistent with the
differences observed in final score.
While these descriptive statistics support the hypothesized relationship between
process accountability and performance where increased deliberate processing mediates
the effect between accountability type and total score, a formal mediation analysis did not
fully support the model. The relationship between accountability type and total score was
not mediated by amount of deliberate processing, although the results were directionally
consistent with the hypothesis. As Figure 10 illustrates, the standardized regression
coefficient between accountability type and average length of comments was statistically
significant; however, the standardized regression coefficient between average number of
comments and total score was not. The standardized indirect effect was (17.49)(-0.25) =
34.59. We tested the significance of this indirect effect using bootstrapping procedures.
Unstandardized indirect effects were computed (using the mediate package in R) for each
of 10,000 bootstrapped samples, and the 95% confidence interval was computed by
determining the indirect effects at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The bootstrapped
unstandardized indirect effect was 0.12, and the 95% confidence interval ranged from 1.84, 4.61. Thus, the indirect effect was not statistically significant.
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More deliberate processing could also have led to less switching, that is, focusing
on the real patterns when they are present led subjects to make fewer errors of
commission. The results of a mediation model where deliberate processing resulted in
less switching was stronger, but not again, definitive. As Figure 11 illustrates, the
standardized regression coefficient between accountability type and was marginally
significant and the standardized regression coefficient between average number of
comments and total score was significant. The standardized indirect effect was (-8.86)(1.64) = 15.70. We again tested the significance of this indirect effect using bootstrapping
procedures. Unstandardized indirect effects were computed (using the mediate package in
R) for each of 10,000 bootstrapped samples, and the 95% confidence interval was
computed by determining the indirect effects at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The
bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was -6.89, and the 95% confidence interval
ranged from -23.12, 11.73. Thus, the indirect effect was not statistically significant.
However, based on the significant links between accountability type, level of deliberate
processing, and total score, it is possible that a larger sample would have yielded a
significant result.

Table 9
Deliberate Processing by Condition in Experiment 1b
Environment
Accountability
Mean
Cohen’s d
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Mean length

Cohen’s d

Random
Random
Random
Non-Random

None
Outcome
Process
None

rationale
count
1.06
0.71
13.17
0.14

Non-Random
Non-Random

Outcome
Process

0.60
17.64

of rationale
-0.29
0.89
-0.86

11.47
6.00
37.02
0.46

-0.32
0.77
-0.60

-0.39
1.21

3.64
36.57

-0.42
0.88

Avg Comment
Length
-0.25

17.49***

Accountability

30.26* (34.59)

Total Score

***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; . p<0.10

Figure 10. Mediation model of average comment length, accountability, and total score.
Standardized regression coefficients for the relationship between accountability type and
total score as mediated by average comment length. The standardized regression
coefficient between accountability type and total score, controlling for average comment
length, is in parentheses.
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Switches
-8.86

.

Accountability

-1.64***

30.26 (15.70)

.
Total Score

***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; . p<0.10

Figure 11. Mediation model of switches, accountability, and total score. Standardized
regression coefficients for the relationship between accountability type and total score as
mediated by number of switches made by the subject. The standardized regression
coefficient between accountability type and total score, controlling for switches, is in
parentheses.
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Figure 12. Scores across trials in Experiment 1b (random / 40 – 60). Process
accountable subjects outperformed outcome and non-accountable subjects (depicted in
dark red) in the non-random environment but underperformed the same conditions in the
random environment (depicted in light red). Shaded areas are standard errors of the
mean scores.

Figure 12 illustrates the divergence of average scores by condition over the course
of the experiment. This is consistent with Hypothesis 4: the predicted effects of fewer
errors of commission (switches) by process accountable subjects occurred, and outcome
subjects did learn to commit fewer errors in the random condition. Figure 12 also
illustrates the effects of process accountability, which diverged significantly depending
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on whether subjects were encountering a random or non-random environment. Outcome
accountable forecasters improved their scores between trials 45 and 60 in the non-random
environment, but before that time committed errors of commission by switching
quadrants more frequently, leading to diminished overall scores. Figures 12 and 13
together show subject performance compared to a hypothetical subject who makes an
initially random choice and stays in the initially chosen quadrant (a normal distribution
around mean of -15) and optimally Bayesian performance (a normal distribution around
the mean of 48). Notably, being accountable for process when faced with a non-random,
predictable environment moved subject performance much closer to optimally Bayesian
in Experiment 1b than it did in Experiment 1a. Conversely, the distributions of scores for
process accountable subjects in a random environment more closely resembled the
random guesser in 1b than in 1a. See Figures 13 and 14.
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Figure 13. Overall score distribution density by conditions in Experiment 1b. The score
distribution for choosing at random is depicted in orange (simulated results from 10,000
games) and the score distribution of an optimal Bayesian in a non-random world is
depicted in brown (simulated results from 10,000 games).
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Figure 14. Score distributions in Experiment 1b by condition, separated. Not accountable
subjects who faced a random environment (depicted in black) performed in a manner
close to choosing at random (depicted in orange). Process accountable subjects who
faced a non-random environment (depicted in purple) performed the best and close to an
optimal Bayesian. Process accountable subjects who faced a random environment
(depicted in green) underperformed.
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Table 10
ANOVA of Accountability and Environment in Experiment 1b
Condition
df
SS
MS
Accountability
2
1536
768
Environment
1
13431
13431
Accountability * Environment
2
8345
4173
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05

F

Pr(>F)

0.91
15.85
4.92

0.407
0.001***
0.009**

Figure 15. Environment and accountability interaction plot. Process accountable
subjects outperformed outcome and not accountable subjects in the non-random
conditions, but underperformed in the random condition.
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To further underscore the boost in performance from process in the non-random
environment but has no significant effect on performance in random environments, see
Table 10 and Figure 15. Table 10 and Figure 15 illustrate the significant interaction
between accountability and environmental randomness. An analysis of variance on total
scores yielded significant variation amongst conditions, F(2, 8345)=4.92, p <.001. A post
hoc Tukey test showed that process accountability in the high validity environment
differed significantly from process in low validity environment at p<.001; process in high
validity also differed significantly from outcome in low validity at p<.001, outcome in
high validity at p<.05, and non-accountable subjects in low validity at p<.003. While
most subjects performed better in the high validity condition than in the low validity one,
process accountable subjects performed significantly worse in the low validity
environment but performed significantly better in the high validity one, an example of
how accountability pressures can act as a dual-edged sword.
Holding subjects accountable for the rationales behind their choices led to
subjects ascertaining that one quadrant was higher-weighted than the rest, as illustrated
by the reduction in switching behavior. Process accountable forecasters identified this
pattern around trial 20, which occurred much more quickly than outcome accountable
ones, who identified the higher-weighted quadrant on average around trial 45. These
results are consistent with Hypotheses 1a and 1b.
Why did process accountable subjects outperform in non-random worlds but
perform significantly worse in random ones? Analyses of participants’ comments are
suggestive. As previously noted in Table 9, subjects held accountable for process wrote
more comments, which were also longer than those written by their non-accountable or
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outcome accountable counterparts. While both other conditions were told in the initial
instructions that they could take notes with the provided comment box below the map, in
Experiment 1 only 19% of subjects not accountable for process wrote comments, whereas
79% of process accountable subjects wrote comments. In Experiment 2, 27% of subjects
who were not process accountable wrote comments, while 60% of process accountable
subjects wrote comments. The comments from the non-accountable and outcome
accountable subjects were sparse, mostly consisting of subjects trying to keep track of
potential patterns of attacks on quadrants with numbers. Many of the process accountable
subjects wrote full-sentence comments. Process accountable subjects were keenly
focused on identifying potential patterns and thus in the non-random environment more
quickly ascertained the quadrant being attacked more often. In the random environment,
pseudo-patterns tended to mislead process accountable subjects. However, some subjects
overcame this tendency, at multiple points commenting that the pattern they first thought
existed did not, or that what was a seemingly random series of hits was actually more
focused on a single quadrant. This active search for disconfirming information appears to
have driven at least some process accountable subjects to change their minds during the
task.
Recognizing the potential selection bias (perhaps only those that figured out the
patterns wrote lengthy comments) in comments generated by subjects in the process
accountability conditions, other analysis is needed. This preliminary conclusion is
reinforced by examining the influence of a trait associated with rational thinking, actively
open-minded thinking (AOMT), on final scores (Haran, Ritov, & Mellers, 2013;
Stanovich, 2011). Several individual differences variables mentioned earlier were
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collected—only AOMT yielded significant results, so only those results are reported
here.
In Study 1, those who scored higher on AOMT and were held accountable had
significantly higher scores than those who were not held accountable but demonstrated
similar levels of AOMT (Table 11). For process accountable subjects, possessing a
tendency to search for disconfirming information likely helps to identify randomness
earlier and reduce the urge to “chase” the correct quadrant. Thus, while spurring subjects
to focus on finding patterns as a justified rationale for the moves that they made (a more
concrete construal), process accountable subjects were possibly too focused on patterns
unless they had higher levels of AOMT (Trope & Liberman, 2010).
Table 11
Regression of Accountability and AOMT with Interaction Term

(Intercept)
Outcome

B

SE

t

p

0.33

20.50

0.02

0.99

-66.07 29.39 -2.25 0.03*

Process

-66.43 31.52 -2.11

0.04

AOMT

-2.00

4.15

-0.48

0.63

Outcome * AOMT

13.85

6.00

2.31

0.02*

Process * AOMT 14.38 6.25
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05

2.30

0.02*

Discussion
Highly stochastic environments are challenging. While being more deliberate and
conscientious about using a process helped subjects pick up on real patterns more
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quickly, it appears that holding people accountable for process makes the task of
navigating random environments more difficult. Process accountability improved
performance in high validity environments while not helping performance in low validity
ones. This was likely because a process focus led subjects to commit fewer errors of
omission in the non-random environment (continuing to find the pattern until it was
found), but more frequent errors of commission in the random environment (continuing
to seek out a non-existent pattern). Outcome accountability did not have much of an
effect on errors of omission in the non-random environment, but outcome focused
subjects did commit fewer errors in the random environment when compared to those
accountable for process. Process accountable subjects also discovered the true pattern
more rapidly than outcome accountable ones in the non-random condition. Based on
these two experiments, there is partial support for Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 4 and full
support for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 3. Accountability, both outcome and process, can
indeed exhibit a dual-edged nature—helpful in some circumstances while harmful in
others.
Some limitations of the current study need to be noted. First, we likely overestimated the effect size of the accountability manipulations. While previous research on
accountability tended to yield results showing large effects (d = 0.80) (Chang, Vieider &
Tetlock, in preparation), there was an asymmetry in effect sizes between the low and high
validity conditions. Future work using the London Quadrants task should use larger
samples (~220 or more subjects) in order to be adequately powered. Because the London
Quadrants task spanned 60 trials as well as the collection of some individual differences
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variables, we recommend using subject samples similar to the ones we had access to via a
university behavioral lab. Such a lengthy task is not ideal for typical online samples.
Second, future work should attempt to disaggregate the effects of the multifaceted nature of the process accountability condition vs. the outcome accountability
condition. While subjects in both conditions were given the opportunity to write
comments into a text box below the map of Lemon, only the subjects in the process
accountable condition were incentivized to do so. A pure process accountability condition
would have told subjects only that they were accountable for the reasons for the choices
they made, while not mandating that they write anything extra. Removing the writing
requirement would more closely match the performance requirements in the outcome
condition. It is possible that the additional time spent on the task, during the writing
process or preparing to write comments, is what led to the score improvements relative to
the outcome and non-accountable conditions. Conversely, a follow-on experiment could
incentivize outcome subjects to write comments, while still relaying that they are
accountable only for their final score. This, again, would parallelize the conditions.
Third, future experiments with the London Quadrants task could further align the
incentive structure for the process and outcome accountability conditions. Outcome
accountable subjects received credit for each additional point they garnered—thus,
process accountable subjects could similarly be incentivized for each rationale provided
in support of a choice. While there is no reason, a priori, to think that an atomized
incentive structure such as the one provided to the outcome accountable subjects would
lead to divergent behavior from the more holistic incentive structure for the process

58

accountable subjects, parallelizing the incentive structures would help to eliminate the
potential confound.
Finally, while the distribution of bomb attacks in each experiment was chosen
because the mathematical solution to the London Quadrants task spelled out differing
courses of behavior, further exploration of the level of randomness in the environment
would shed light on when exactly does process accountability help, harm, or do nothing
to performance. In the conditions that featured completely random targeting of quadrants,
in both experiments the direction of effects, while not significant, were consistent with
the hypothesized relationships between accountability type and environmental validity.
Further experiments should systematically explore the spectrum of randomness between
the low validity conditions (arguably “no validity”) and the high validity conditions, and
extending beyond the 60% concentration of bomb attacks in a single quadrant. This can
be done in a few ways. First, by exploring the degrees of randomness between 25%
concentration of bomb attacks in one quadrant and the 40% condition that appeared in
Experiment 2, we can begin to understand just how little or how much of pattern process
accountable subjects can pick up on. By gradually increasing the amount of nonrandomness, perhaps in as granular an incremental manner as a single percentage point
difference, we can pinpoint the threshold at which process accountability begins to focus
people on real patterns in the environment. Similarly, by exploring the degrees of
randomness between the 40% concentration of bomb attacks condition in Experiment 2
and the 60% concentration of bomb attacks condition in Experiment 1, we can identify
the point at which the task becomes too easy (the pattern of attacks in one quadrant is
obvious) and the effects of process accountability are swamped by the task structure.
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Ideally, such a systematic approach to further experiments can hone in on the
“Goldilocks” zone in which process accountability is helpful, the point at which process
ceases to be helpful (and perhaps degrades judgments) because the patterns are too
difficult to pick up on (the lower boundary on effects), and the point at which the task is
too easy and everyone performs well (the upper boundary on effects).
Overall, the current results give some credence to the idea that process
accountability specifically helps in some situations, but has no effect or potentially
hinders performance in others. Logically, being accountable for following a process
should only be helpful when the process reliably leads to desired outcomes. People
navigating highly random environments, where there is likely no useful process that can
be developed, are likely better served by focusing on outcomes. Outcome accountability
helps by helping people spot randomness rather than trying to make sense of patterns that
aren’t there. Consistent with the dozens of past studies (Chang, Vieider & Tetlock, in
preparation) that have shown process accountability to be helpful in laboratory tasks
where incentivizing deliberate processing is helpful when processes reliably lead to
desired outcomes, process focus in a non-random world gets people to spot real patterns
sooner. Choosing the most helpful kind of accountability requires knowing what kind of
world one operates in, to the extent that knowledge is attainable.
However, in a world where even those who are experienced in the field are
uncertain about the nature of the environment, recommending a simple accountability
prescription is wholly inadequate. Here, a hybrid form of accountability that incentivizes
both process and outcome may help people perform better universally. Preliminary
results from Chang et al. (2017) indicate that hybrids could actually help in environments
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where the level of randomness fluctuates or is not known ex ante. Hybrids constitute a
type of intervention that is just now starting to receive experimental attention, but has
long been in use in some financial firms and some government agencies. Future work is
needed to explore whether or not hybrid accountability systems can tamp down the
tendency to chase goals in highly random environments, while also boosting the speed
with which subjects are able to extract real signals in noisy environments.
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CHAPTER 2
Accountability and Strategies for Avoiding Outcome-Biased Blame
ABSTRACT
Probabilistic language is frequently used to describe uncertainties in everyday life.
Researchers note that while verbal expressions of probability (e.g., likely, unlikely) are
more naturalistic, numeric expressions (e.g., 55%) are more precise and verifiable. While
decision makers have been criticized for continual usage of vague verbal expressions due
to their lack of specificity (“weasel” words), decision makers may prefer these phrases
because they can be employed to avoid blame for over- or under-estimating the
probability of future events. In a series of experiments, two sets of subjects, one
consisting of individuals with governmental policy-making experience and one
representing the general public, were asked for their perceptions of the probability of a
terrorist attack. Probabilities were relayed as high or low likelihood estimates and either
verbally or numerically. Subjects were then asked whether these estimates were justified
after learning of one of four possible outcomes: 1) a terrorist plot successfully thwarted,
2) a hoax terrorist plot properly identified, 3) a terrorist plot unsuccessfully thwarted, and
4) a hoax terrorist plot not properly identified as such. In the first study, policymakers
preferred verbal probabilities over numeric ones, with some subjects justifying this
preference by stating that the numeric probabilities gave the illusion of precision. In the
second study, subjects standing in for the general public judged negative outcomes more
harshly when they were relayed with numeric probabilities than with verbal ones. The
results of this study show that preference for vague expressions of probability may be a
rational defense mechanism against anticipated outcome bias.
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Introduction
For democracy to function properly, policymakers must be held accountable for
their actions (Przeworski et al., 1999; Tocqueville, 1945). Typically, in order for
accountability to be carried out and responsibility properly assigned, the original
judgment must be specific, public, and the eventual outcome unambiguous. However,
political actors (e.g., policymakers, pundits, legislators, etc.) typically express their
judgments in ambiguous ways with vague verbal probabilities (e.g., likely, more often
than not, possibly). Most recently, intelligence agencies have been criticized for
conveying their assessments in vague probabilistic terms, as opposed to more specific
numeric ones (Friedman & Zeckhauser, 2015; Tetlock & Mellers, 2011a).
The benefits of using vague language and consistent departures from the behavior
predicted by expected utility theory has been a subject of ongoing interest within political
science, specifically within the context of leaders’ and legislators’ public expressions of
policy preferences (Alesina & Cukierman, 1987; Page, 1976; Tomz & Van Houweling,
2009). Does the rationality of probabilistic posturing as a form of accountability
avoidance extend to politicians’ judgments of future events?
Verbal vs. Numeric Probabilities
What are the key differences between verbal and numeric expressions of
probabilities and how do these advantages and disadvantages relate to accountability
systems? Using verbal probabilities is widely thought to be more natural and common
(Wallsten & Budescu, 1995). Wallsten, Budescu, Zwick, and Kemp (1993) found that the
primary perceived advantages of preferring verbal probabilities included ease of use,
while being able to convey higher precision drove the preference for numeric
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probabilities. While most respondents were unable to articulate when and why they
would switch between the two modes, those that did respond primarily cited issue
importance and data quality as reasons for switching: probabilities associated with
unimportant and uncertain issues should be expressed verbally while important issues
with higher data quality should be expressed numerically.
Previous research found similar patterns in preferences for and against numeric
and verbal probabilities (Budescu & Wallsten, 1985, 1990), with the imprecision of
verbal probabilities (due to wide variance and lack of interpersonal agreement as to how
exactly verbal phrases map to numeric ranges) as one notable drawback to verbal
probabilities (Budescu & Wallsten, 1985; Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994; Hamm,
1991; Rapoport, Wallsten, Erev, & Cohen, 1990).
Blame, Credit, and Accountability Avoidance
When would decision-makers try to avoid accountability by using vague
verbiage? National-level decision-makers, from executive branch policymakers to
legislators, have been characterized as having the motive of maximizing credit and
minimizing blame in an effort to retain their jobs (Sulitzeanu-Kenan & Hood). To go
from this general rational motive to action requires the opportunity to choose alternatives
that allow for credit maximization and blame minimization. It logically follows that when
the balance between credit and blame is weighted towards blame, accountability should
be avoided and vague probabilities preferred – a choice consistent with other sociofunctionalist frameworks (Tetlock, 2002). Conversely, when a policymaker wants to
maximize credit – supporting pro-business policies that lead to gains in equity markets,
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for example – they may choose to use precise probabilities because they want people to
evaluate them for their decision.
Thus, choosing to employ vague verbiage is an example of a low-effort evasion
tactic around accountability (M. C. Green, Visser, & Tetlock, 2000) and a way to manage
public impressions by being imprecise to the point where the observer has no firm
grounding for what probability was actually communicated (Leary & Kowalski, 1990).
Resorting to vague verbiage is a choice that policymakers would likely make (based on
the audience approval motive) insofar as they believe that the public will seek to blame
them for failing 1) to properly predict an event outcome and 2) to take the steps necessary
to prevent this outcome (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock & Lerner, 1999), even if the
outcome chance was remote to begin with. Essentially, policymakers are taking
advantage of the communicative ambiguity inherent in conveying probabilities verbally
(Patt & Schrag, 2003).
It follows that numeric probabilities can be disadvantageous because the
transmitter is on the hook for their judgments, as the numbers are concrete and can be
evaluated for accuracy. Those who are held accountable may feel trapped by numeric
probabilities and would therefore prefer vague verbal probabilities when they are seeking
to avoid accountability. Numeric estimates are scorable via proper and other rules and for
which deviation from normative standards of calibration and resolution can be measured
(Brier, 1950; Murphy & Winkler, 1984; Winkler & Murphy, 1968), allowing
accountability processes to be carried out. Policymakers likely take into account the
outcome bias of the public in the evaluation of their decisions and seek to minimize their
exposure to outcome biased blaming, which is more likely to occur when the probability
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of event occurrence is high (Agrawal & Maheswaran, 2005; Baron & Hershey, 1988;
Mazzocco, Alicke, & Davis, 2004). From this, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1a: Decision-makers will prefer to employ vague verbal probability
expressions when the event has a high probability of occurrence.
Blame avoidance and credit taking also likely explain policymaker preferences
when the probability of event occurrence is low. Policymakers may seek to inoculate
themselves from accusations of not warning of an event when it comes to those that are
associated with high cost functions but low probabilities of occurrence, such as terrorist
acts (which pumps up the cost of false negatives and minimizes the perceived, but not
actual, costs of false positives). On the other hand, decision-makers may choose to
employ precise numeric probabilities when they are seeking to maximize credit, which
would be less costly if the event in question was one with positive consequences. In the
case of blame avoidance and minimization, likely associated with events with negative
consequences, policymakers want to people to remember their warnings and to be able to
evaluate them for accuracy when the costs of a false negative are higher than the costs of
a false positive. Policymakers are additionally aided by the fact that people tend to
interpret numeric probabilities in a directionally ambiguous manner, in effect allowing
the communicator to argue that they meant to emphasize either the possibility of
occurrence of non-occurrence of the event depending on how things turned out (Bilgin &
Brenner, 2013). High probability numeric probabilities are almost always interpreted
“positively” (that the event will occur) (Bilgin & Brenner, 2013). Thus, it follows that:
Hypothesis 1b: Decision-makers will prefer to employ precise numeric
expressions when the event has a low probability of occurrence.
66

Because vague probabilities are imprecise and can be interpreted in a myriad of
ways, policymakers can resort to self-justifying explanations for their actions regardless
of how the event turns out. However, because numeric probabilities are evaluable and
precise, policymakers may find themselves cut-off from employing such self-justifying
behavior. Indeed, Friedman et al. (2017), surveying national security professionals, found
decision-makers were less willing to support risky actions when those risks were
conveyed quantitatively and more willing to seek additional information to improve their
understanding of the situation. From this, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2a: Decision-makers will feel more justified in their decision to act
on high probability events and less justified on low probability events after
employing vague verbiage.
Hypothesis 2b: Decision-makers will feel less justified in their decision to act on
high probability events (but not low probability events) after employing numeric
probabilities.
The general public, on the other hand, likely has a different take on the value of
communicating warnings with verbal or numeric probabilities. While verbal probabilities
feel more naturalistic and are more commonly used in everyday language, they leave
room for interpretation as to what exactly was meant and are often context dependent
(Brun & Teigen, 1988). Even interpretation of the qualifiers of verbal expressions (e.g.,
some, not all) are seemingly context dependent (Teigen & Brun, 2003). Because the
receiver must infer the ultimate meaning of verbal expressions of uncertainty, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to judge the accuracy of verbal estimates, especially in cases
where the transmitter of the estimate is in disagreement with its recipient. In this case,
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numeric probabilities are advantageous precisely because they convey exact information.
In fact, robust results from past research have shown that people generally prefer precise
expressions of uncertainty over imprecise ones (Curley & Yates, 1985; Einhorn &
Hogarth, 1985; Ellsberg, 1961). There are some exceptions to the general preference for
ambiguity aversion, such as a preference for verbal probabilities when the underlying
data quality is poor, especially for the transmitter (recipients still preferred precise
estimates) (Olson & Budescu, 1997). On the other hand, precise numeric probabilities
hold advantages for account-takers because it leaves little room for the accountable to
wiggle out of evaluations of the accuracy of their judgments, and experimental evidence
supports the idea that people like to receive numeric assessments (Wallsten & Budescu,
1995).
Thus, the public may have different interpretations of the wisdom of employing
vague verbiage or precise probabilities. The general public may prefer precise
probabilities at all times because they are the account-takers. They may perceive
policymakers who choose to employ vague verbiage as blame-avoiders and thus see them
in a harsher light. It follows that audiences may also see action as more justified when
precise numeric probabilities are used, possibly because (as previously discussed) precise
probabilities convey stronger underlying information. Finally, it is possible that after
performing all of this mental processing, the public audience may not actually be
outcome-biased at all, insofar as they seek to make their thinking processes coherent and
generally try to reduce dissonance. A public audience may ignore the likelihood (level of
assessed probability) that the policymaker conveyed in the first place. For example, if the
policymaker conveyed the probabilities precisely and the event did not occur, even if the
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event was assessed as low probability to begin with, the audience may feel that the false
positive was justified. From this, we draw the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: Observers will generally prefer numeric probabilities.
Hypothesis 4: Observers who receive precise warning information will feel that a
policymaker was not justified in taking action if the result is a false positive but
not a false negative.

Method
Procedure and Subjects
The current study was conducted in two parts. In Experiment 1, subjects with
government and policymaking experience (N=113) were recruited and responded to a
survey. Within this sample, 65% had either a master’s degree or professional degree, 65%
served between 1 and 10 years in government, 57% were between the ages of 30 and 40,
and 30% had served in a policy role.
Experiment 1 subjects were told to imagine being the President of the United
States and randomly presented with information warning of a possible terrorist attack
either as high- or low-likelihood. Subjects were then given a choice of conveying this
information to the public, either as verbal (e.g., likely, unlikely) or numeric (70%, 20%)
probabilities. At this point in the study, the subjects were presented with a choice: they
could either act or not act, depending on how they viewed the severity and veracity of the
warnings they were given. Subjects were then asked how justified they felt in taking
action based on the information presented. Then, based on their choice to take action or
not take action, the subjects were randomly informed of whether their inaction or action
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led to good or bad outcomes. Inaction could avoid an error of commission or commit an
error of omission, and taking action could avoid an error of omission or commit an error
of commission. At the end of the experimental section of the survey, subjects were again
asked how justified they felt in taking action, and then answered an individual differences
survey to collect demographic and other information.
In the second part of this study, Experiment 2, we used a similar design but
changed the role of subjects. Undergraduate subjects (N=141) were recruited to play the
role of the general public (which in this context translates to political account-takers) for
course credit. 67% of the sample identified as female and 44% were Caucasian. Subjects
were randomly informed of one of four options: that the President had been given
information that showed either a low or high likelihood of a future terrorist attack and
that information was presented either verbally or numerically.
Materials
Experiment 1 (“policymaker”) subjects were asked to imagine acting as the
President of the United States. They were warned of an impending terrorist attack before
a major holiday and the likelihood of the attack could be either high or low. Subjects then
had the choice of conveying the warning to the public with either a verbal or numeric
probability. They were then asked whether they would ground all civilian aircraft ahead
of the holiday or allow flights to continue and also how justified they felt about taking
such an action. Following their response, they were randomly assigned an outcome
variable, either actions coupled with a positive or negative outcome (e.g., you decided to
ground flights but the attack turned out to be a hoax, or you grounded flights and several
terrorists were arrested on their way to the airport) or inaction coupled with positive or
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negative outcomes. They were then asked to rate how justified they felt in taking or not
taking action (1 = completely not justified to 7 = completely justified). For the complete
survey that was administered to subjects in Experiment 1, see the methodological
appendix for Chapter 2.
Experiment 2 (“public”) subjects were told that the President of the United States
had received either verbal or numeric warnings at either low or high likelihoods of an
impending terrorist attack and were asked how justified the President would be if the
President decided to ground all air traffic in light of this information. Subjects were then
randomly presented with the choice of the president, either to ground all aircraft or not
ground any aircraft. They were asked to rate how justified the actions were at a second
point. Finally, subjects were informed of the outcome of the action depending on whether
they were presented with action or inaction by the President: the outcomes could be good
(e.g., action that stopped the terrorist attack or inaction that led to avoiding an error of
commission, falling for a hoax) or bad (e.g., action that led to making an error of
commission, in this case falling for a hoax, or inaction that led to an error of omission, in
this case a successful terrorist attack). For the complete survey that was administered to
subjects in Experiment 2, see the methodological appendix for Chapter 2.
Results
Experiment 1
In the initial analysis, we wanted to see if there was an impact of probabilistic
likelihood on the kind of expression chosen. Overall, subjects chose to convey warnings
to the public about equally between numeric and verbal probabilities, with 48%
preferring to warn with numeric probabilities and 52% preferring verbal ones. Whether
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there was a high or low likelihood of a terrorist attack predicted the choice of
probabilities (B = .51, SE = .08, t=6.15(111), p < .001) where a high likelihood of an
attack pushed subjects to choose vague verbal probabilities per Table 1. This supports
Hypothesis 1a, which posited that subjects would prefer numeric probabilities when
likelihoods are low, and also supports Hypothesis 1b, which posited that when
likelihoods are high, subjects would prefer to employ vague verbal probabilities.
Table 1
Subject Probability Type Choices Based on Likelihood of Attack in Experiment 1
Probability
Type
Event Likelihood Chosen
n
% of Subjects
Low Likelihood Numeric
46
41%
High Likelihood Numeric
8
7%
Low Likelihood Verbal
21
19%
High Likelihood Verbal
38
34%
Next, we wanted to see if there was a difference in perceived justification level
based on whether the outcome experienced was positive or negative. As expected,
subjects who were randomly assigned to a condition with higher likelihoods of attack
were more likely to choose to ground flights (B = .21, SE = .09, t=2.25(111), p < .03). In
aggregate, the average level of perceived justification of the decision made was
approximately 4.9, with differences (t=5.46(85.7), p < .001) between those who
experienced positive outcomes (n=57, M= 5.7, SD = .96) versus negative ones (n=56,
M=4.2, SD=1.74), registering a large effect (d = -1.03). Experiencing negative outcomes
predicted decreases in justification levels (B = -1.45, SE = 0.26, p < .001).
Based on these results, we then investigated whether or not the chosen mode of
probabilistic expression and the likelihood of event occurrence interacted with outcome
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type on justification levels. Subjects felt more justified in their decision to act after
employing vague verbiage, while those who chose to use numeric probabilities felt less
justified even when the probability of occurrence was high (possibly feeling regretful for
being so precise). Overall, there is full support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. See Table 2 and
Figures 1 and 2 for interactions.
Table 2
ANOVA of Outcome Type, Likelihood, and Choice of Probability Type on Justification in
Experiment 1
df
Outcome Type
Choice of Prob Type
Likelihood
Outcome * Prob Type
Outcome * Likelihood
Prob Type * Likelihood
Outcome * Prob Type *
Likelihood
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05

3
1
1
3
3
1

SS
77.05
0.32
1.41
1.52
20.99
8.39

MS
25.684
0.315
1.407
0.508
6.997
8.388

F
14.801
0.182
0.811
0.293
4.032
4.834

Pr(>F)
0.001***
0.67
0.370
0.830
0.010**
0.030*

3

1.68

0.56

0.322

0.800
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Figure 1. Interaction between event likelihood and probability type choice for
policymaker subjects. Subjects felt more justified with their choice when they chose to
express their warnings numerically when event likelihood was low and verbally when
event likelihood was high. Conversely, subjects felt less justified with their choice when
they chose to express their warnings numerically when event likelihood was high and
verbally when event likelihood was low.
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Figure 2. Action and outcome type influences perceived justification of action for
policymaker subjects. Subjects felt more justified with their actions when they took action
regardless of the outcome type; however, they felt less justified when they successfully
acted to prevent a high probability of attack (expected success) and less justified when
they acted unsuccessfully against a low probability attack. Subjects felt generally less
justified when they did not act and the outcome was negative. Mean levels of justification
with SE error bars.
Experiment 2
Subjects in Experiment 2 encountered similar stimulus materials to subjects in
Experiment 1, with the key change of perspective being that they served as observers of a
President conveying threat information and making decisions about how best to mitigate
the threat. Here we sought to examine whether the probability type used to express the
warning of attack interacted with the likelihood of attack on perceived justification levels
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for taking action. As expected, subjects felt that the fictional President would have been
more justified in taking action when the likelihood of attack was relayed as high. While
in general subjects felt that numeric probabilities were a stronger justification for action,
the probability type used to convey the threat information interacted such that verballyconveyed high likelihoods were associated with the higher levels of justification
compared to verbally-conveyed low likelihoods (F=4.09(124), p=.045). See Figure 3.
This partially supports Hypothesis 3.

Figure 3. Interaction between probability type and event likelihood on justification level
for general public subjects. Subjects perceived justification levels for action as higher
when the event likelihood was high and the warning was conveyed with numeric
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probabilities, although the shift upwards in justification level was stronger for verbal
probabilities moving from low to high likelihood of event occurrence.
What drove subjects’ justification levels once they were informed that actions
were taken to mitigate the threat as well as the outcome? Subjects demonstrated at least
some outcome bias—their justification levels were higher when the outcome was positive
(B = 1.49, p <0.001) and when action was taken (B = 1.17, p < 0.001), but they also
showed decreases in perceived justification level when the likelihood of the event was
high and the information was conveyed numerically, which supports Hypothesis 4. See
Table 3.
Table 3
Regression Analysis for Outcomes and Probability Types on Post-Action Justification
Level in Experiment 2
B
SE
t
p
(Intercept)
3.654
0.323
11.301
0.001***
Likelihood
0.612
0.347
1.763
0.081
Prob Type
0.204
0.341
0.600
0.550
Outcome Type
1.494
0.339
4.408
0.001***
Action Taken
1.175
0.336
3.495
0.001***
Likelihood * Prob Type
-1.106
0.492
-2.248
0.027*
Outcome * Action
-0.589
0.488
-1.207
0.230
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05
What drove the change in justification level for the general public stand-in
subjects? Interestingly, shifts in justification level – from before the outcome was known
to after – were largely driven by independent factors. Subjects decreased their
justification levels from measurement at time-1 to time-2 when the probability was
conveyed numerically and likelihoods were high, while shifting upwards their level of
perceived justification of action when the outcomes were positive and when action was
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taken by decision-makers, demonstrating both bias towards action and outcome bias. See
Table 4.
Table 4
Regression Analysis for Differences in Justification Levels Between Time 1 and 2 in
Experiment 2
B
SE
t
p
(Intercept)
-0.171
0.410
-0.416
0.678
Likelihood
-1.035
0.440
-2.352
0.020*
Prob Type
-1.041
0.432
-2.412
0.018*
Outcome Type
1.255
0.429
2.924
0.004**
Action Taken
1.048
0.426
2.460
0.015*
Likelihood * Prob Type
-0.138
0.623
-0.221
0.826
Outcome * Action
-0.208
0.618
-0.337
0.737
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05
Discussion
To review, decision-makers generally preferred conveying the likelihood of event
occurrence with verbal probabilities when probabilities were high and numeric
probabilities when they were low. This result supports Hypotheses 1a and 1b, which
predicted the lowest risk use of language, as predicted by a desire to avoid blame in the
event that things turned out badly. Decision-maker subjects also felt more justified in
their decisions after conveying verbal probabilities than when warnings were conveyed
numerically, supporting Hypotheses 2a and 2b. The subjects who stood in for the
“public” demonstrated outcome bias in their judgments of decision-makers, rating them
as less justified in taking action when things turned out poorly than when they turned out
successfully. An interaction was present between likelihood and probability type, which
shows that subjects felt decisions were less justifiable when the likelihood of the event
was high and when that likelihood was conveyed (precisely) numerically. Overall,
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subjects felt decisions were more justifiable when conveyed verbally. This partially
supports Hypothesis 3 and fully supports Hypothesis 4.
Some limitations to the current study are worth noting. First, the negative
consequences of the terrorist attack made blame avoidance more likely than credit taking.
It is possible that given a different kind of uncertain event – for example, the passage of a
tax bill that would lead to an increase in economic growth or gains in the stock market –
subjects may have made different choices for how they conveyed probabilities. Future
work should explore how positive and negative valence of events influences or doesn’t
influence the choice of probabilistic expression. Second, it is possible that policymaker
subjects in Experiment 1 interpreted “unlikely” in a negative way, that is, they saw
unlikely as conveying zero or close to zero probability of event occurrence. Thus, the
preference for 20% in the low likelihood condition was spurred not by a preference for
blame avoidance via precision but by the word “unlikely” unintentionally conveying an
even lower likelihood. This limitation can be addressed by future research in several
ways, two of which we will enumerate here.
Follow-on experimentation could not only manipulate event valence but could
present to subjects the same stimuli, that there is intelligence information showing
indications of a terrorist attack and then allow subjects to choose to express a warning
from a range of numeric probabilities (0-49% in a low likelihood condition, 51-100% in a
high likelihood condition) or a range of verbal probabilities. By providing a range of
options, we can begin to address the objection against unintended interpretations of
arguably unequal probabilistic expressions (e.g., likely vs. 70%). Another potential
follow-on experiment could more directly address probabilistic expression type
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preference by prompting subjects that there is a low or high probability of event
occurrence, then asking them how they would choose to express such a probability either
numerically or verbally (via random assignment). After they make their initial choice,
they would then be prompted with a choice of switching from numeric to verbal
expression and vice versa. This experimental variation more directly accesses preferences
for expression as an explicit choice. By allowing the subjects to choose their preferred
word or number to express an event warning and then making the distinction between
verbal and numeric expressions an explicit choice, subjects are not asked to make a
choice that is potentially a false duality. Finally, it should be noted that the stimuli
materials provided to subjects conveyed minimal information regarding the credibility of
the information contained in the warning. Subjects may have found it difficult to choose a
high numeric likelihood since doing so without more detailed information may have felt
(justifiably) imprecise. Follow-on experiments should add more detail to the stimuli to
see if that has an effect on the making a choice between numeric and verbal probability
expressions.
Taken altogether, the aforementioned results should give us pause at universally
recommending that decision-makers and others in government should convey
probabilistic information numerically (Barnes, 2016; Dhami, Mandel, Mellers, &
Tetlock, 2015; Friedman & Zeckhauser, 2012; Rapoport et al., 1990; Wallsten, 1990). It
is possible that decision-makers have an intuitive understanding of the ways in which
their constituencies and the public writ large demonstrate outcome bias in how they
evaluate decisions. If the public tends to more harshly judge decision-makers when things
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go badly and less harshly when things turn out okay, using purposefully vague verbiage
may be a linguistic defense mechanism against unfair evaluation.
Certainly, there is value in numeric probabilities since they are more precise and
thus forecasts made with them are verifiable, but the extent that this utility is reflected in
policymaker considerations is unknown. It is also potentially erroneous to think that
precision and verifiability factor into net policymaker utility. Scientists may prefer such
precise numbers, but being intentionally vague may be a rational and pre-emptive defense
against post-hoc biased public perceptions of decisions.
Finally, what is politically rational might still be cognitively suboptimal in several
ways. Friedman, Lerner, and Zeckhauser (2017) found that decision makers tended to be
less willing to support risky actions after viewing numeric probabilities and were more
willing to seek additional information. Numeric probabilities essentially exposed their
gaps in knowledge. Verbal probabilities also contain less precise information, which
makes it harder to verify, assess, and learn from mis-calibrated estimates. This reduction
in precision also degrades the quality of deliberations and debates because the sender and
receiver of the probabilities do not know exactly how those probabilities will be
interpreted. Future work should focus on whether numeric probabilities help people learn
more quickly from mistakes (an as-yet untested proposition) and the degree to which
numeric probabilities offer more inter-subjective agreement than verbal probabilities.

81

CHAPTER 3
Accountability and an Increased Need for Cognitive Closure
ABSTRACT
Politicians usually enact policies that are congruent with their political ideology, even
when the net utility of doing so is not yet known. Democratic accountability may
exacerbate this tendency, as political leaders may feel pressure to ideological congruency
especially keenly when they are seeking office or running for re-election. This is contrary
to the widespread notion that democratic accountability is the most powerful lever that
constituents have over their elected officials for ensuring the advancement of public
interest. In this study, subjects were asked about two politically-charged issues,
environmental cleanup or gun safety, and whether they preferred a risky enactment of
such policies for saving lives (e.g., a 90% chance of saving 100 lives, a 50% chance of
saving 100 lives, or a 10% chance of saving 100 lives) over an ideologically and value
neutral one, in this case, funding a new hospital (e.g., which would save 90, 50 or 10
lives, respectively). Subjects universally preferred politically congruent policies, despite a
value neutral option being available. This preference occurred regardless of whether they
were held accountable or not. Political ideology predicted the amount of ambiguity
reduction needed for recommending both the environmental cleanup and gun safety
policies.

Keywords: political ideology, democratic accountability, ambiguity reduction, need for
closure
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Introduction
Political leaders and appointed policymakers are elected to implement policies
(i.e., legally binding rules and regulations) that advance the public interest. These policy
preferences are typically congruent with an individuals’ political ideology (Dutt & Mitra,
2005; Jost et al., 2009). These policy choices involve uncertainty about whether the
policy ultimately will be successful. Because the outcomes from enacted policy are
uncertain, especially when the policies (pre-implementation) lack supporting empirical
evidence of their efficacy, political leaders often base their policy preferences and
priorities on underlying ideology (Budge, 1994). However, the linkage between political
ideology and which policy choices to pursue is far from direct, as this relationship is
constrained by the accountability structures present in democracies (both for sanctioning
leaders who pursue unpopular policies and for promoting leaders who do) and attenuated
by uncertainty regarding the net impact (positive or negative) of the policy in question
(Przeworski et al., 1999).
The contemporary debate over climate change science and associated policies
illustrates how uncertainty about outcomes can be erased by the psychological pressure
from political ideology. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 2013
report clearly lays out the physical science case for man-made climate change and
appropriately caveats each concluding statement with probabilistic language, indicating
uncertainty level.2 While the IPCC does acknowledge that uncertainty exists at the
margins, those who disagree with the IPCC’s conclusions label the work of the scientists

2

See: http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/
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as a “hoax” and “conspiracy”, essentially erasing the mountains of physical evidence that
is concordant with the vast majority of theories of man-made climate change.3
Conversely, those with potentially legitimate disagreements with the science who
do not entirely believe the scientific results underpinning climate change claims have
been labeled “denialists.”4 This is despite the fact that warranted skepticism is an
essential element to the advancement of science and the execution of the scientific
method. Even though the predictions from climate change science are imperfect and the
research is presented with appropriate caveats by organizations such as the IPCC, many
people aligned with liberal political leanings reflexively denounce and negatively label
anyone with potentially legitimate concerns regarding scientific uncertainty (Armstrong,
K. C. Green, & Soon, 2008; K. C. Green & Armstrong, 2007; K. C. Green & Armstrong,
2008; K. C. Green, Armstrong, & Soon, 2009; Hoffman, 2011; McCright & Dunlap,
2011). By denying that such uncertainty exists, the result is that the policy choice is
presented as “riskless”, such that the costs of implementing climate change policies, if
man-made climate change is actually a false positive, are completely ignored
(Leiserowitz, 2006).
Psychologically, by attempting to erase the uncertainty surrounding climate
science, politically liberal individuals are demonstrating an increased need for cognitive
closure, a psychological trait and state that has been mostly used to describe those with
more conservative political leanings (Chirumbolo et al., 2004; Jost, 2006; Jost &
Amodio, 2012; Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2007; Jost et al., 2008). While typically
3

https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/6/1/15726472/trump-tweets-global-warming-parisclimate-agreement; https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/science/exxon-mobil-rockefellers-climatechange.html
4
http://news.sciencemag.org/scientific-community/2015/09/associated-press-no-more-climate-skeptics-ordeniers
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investigated as a dispositional variable, some researchers, such as Arie Kruglanski and
others, have shown that need for cognitive closure can be seen as proportional in
magnitude to the benefits of closure and costs of lacking closure, as well as moderated by
situational factors (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006; Webster &
Kruglanski, 1997; Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996). We would expect similar
motivation to reduce the distance from closure for conservatives when the outcomes from
an ideologically aligned issue are similarly uncertain. From this literature, we
hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: The level of decision risk a policymaker is willing to accept is
negatively correlated with preference for a policy.

Citizens are interested in ensuring that political leaders are acting in their best
interest, and electoral accountability is the primary lever that they can pull to keep
politicians honest. Accountability is considered an essential feature of democracy
because it provides the feedback loop that improves governance and aligns policymaker
choices to public opinion over time (Bovens et al., 2014; Cheibub & Przeworski, 1999).
However, the force exerted by accountability pressures could actually be
counterproductive insofar as it pushes political leaders to adopt ideologically-aligned
policies while down-weighting the risks associated with policy implementation. From
this, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2: Accountability to the public increases the amount of cognitive
closure reduction sought for politically-incongruent policy preferences.
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Hypothesis 3: Accountability to the public decreases the amount of cognitive
closure associated with politically-congruent policy preferences.

Empirical evidence suggests that the presence and use of accountability
mechanisms does not always lead to improved outcomes and could actually lead to more
extreme judgments, specifically when audience views are made known (Lerner &
Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock & Kim, 1987). It is possible that
accountability moderates the relationship between the amount of cognitive closure sought
to support or not support a specific policy, a previously unexplored relationship among
accountability, political ideology, and choice to pursue specific policy preferences. From
this, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4: Ideologically-congruent policy preference is increased when
accountability is present.
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Figure 1. Accountability, need for closure, and political ideology full model.
Accountability moderates the relationship between political ideology and policy
preferences, such that it increases need for closure on incongruent policy matters.

Method
Procedures and Subjects
In this study, subjects were confronted with choosing between two policy
initiatives that have the same expected value in terms of lives saved.5 Subjects were
recruited from undergraduate political organizations (e.g., Young Democrats, College
Republicans) from several major research universities based in the United States. A total
of 490 subjects answered the survey. Surveys were sent to various student political email
lists in order to try to balance the ideological perspectives of subjects. The sample

5

Issues drawn from http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/section-4-political-compromise-and-divisivepolicy-debates/ and http://www.pewresearch.org/key-data-points/environment-energy-2/
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included 37.3% who self-identified as Democrats, 33.5% who self-identified as
Republicans, and 18.6% who self-identified as Independent, with the remaining ~10%
identifying with other parties such as the Green or Libertarian Party. The sample was
43.1% female and 74.7% Caucasian. All subjects were asked about one of two issues
(randomized): gun safety and environmental protection.

Design
The study design was 2x3 full-factorial design, no accountability vs.
accountability, and low vs. medium vs. high levels of uncertainty. Subjects were
randomly assigned to one of six conditions. They were asked to imagine that they were a
small-town mayor who was either up for re-election (accountable) or term-limited (not
accountable). Accountable subjects were informed that while they were the incumbent in
the upcoming election (i.e., up for re-election), they faced a stiff challenge from another
candidate and that while they had won election earlier, their decision would weigh
heavily on prospects for re-election. The accountability situation in which subjects found
themselves was essentially accountability to a superior entity, in this case, the voting
public, whose views were left unknown deliberately (as unknown views tend to generate
higher levels of deliberate thinking and improved decisions, based on the conclusions
from the review of accountability literature in Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).
Two issues, environmental issues and gun safety, were selected due to their high
levels of ideological polarization. Subjects were randomly presented with one of three
value neutral scenarios within each issue. For example, in the environmental clean-up
scenario, they were told that they had the choice of signing a bill into law that would lead

88

to the probability (90%, 50%, or 10%) of 100 lives saved, or they could not sign the bill
and spend the money on a hospital that would save 90, 50, or 10 lives, an amount equal to
the expected value of the environmental clean-up law. Those who were shown the gun
safety issue were presented with the same choice—to sign into law a gun safety bill that
would have some probability of saving 100 lives (90%, 50% or 10%) or they could not
sign the bill and fund a hospital that would save 90, 50, or 10 lives, respectively.6
Subjects were then asked how likely they were to sign either the gun safety or
environmental clean-up bill into law. After responding with the likelihood of signing the
bill into law, subjects were then presented with a follow-on scenario in which they could
ask for further research into the proposed policy. They were informed that this additional
research could lead to up to a 10, 50 or 90% increase in the probability of lives saved
(aligned with the initial level of risk presented). Subjects were then asked how much risk
reduction they required for them to be 100% likely to sign the bill into law. For the
complete surveys sent to subjects, see the methodological appendix for Study 3.
Results
We first wanted to see if there were differences in likelihood of policy adoption
based on ideology. Subjects’ likelihood of enacting policy largely mirrored the initial
levels of risk regarding the efficacy of the policy. For example, if policy was 90% likely
to save 100 lives, approximately 90% of subjects supported the policy. This effect
appeared largely independent of political ideology for the environmental clean-up

6

While not the major focus of this study, one would expect the “gain framing” effects (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981) to be significantly dampened, based on the results of follow-on work on framing effects
in political science (Druckman, 2001a, 2001b).
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scenario. Ideology did not increase or decrease the average level of support for the
environmental clean-up policy for Democrats, Republicans, or Independents.
Only in the gun safety scenario did political ideology effects appear, as those selfidentifying as Republican were 2-12% less likely to pass the bill than both those who
self-identified as Independents and Democrats. A post hoc Tukey test showed that
Republicans were less likely to adopt the bill than both Independents (p < .001) and
Democrats (p = .04). Republicans were more demanding when it came to risk reduction
requirements for the gun safety bill, requesting between 0.4%-6% reduction in
uncertainty before having convincing evidence of the policy’s efficacy; however, these
differences were not significant after conducting a post hoc Tukey test. Likewise,
Republicans were more demanding when it came to risk reduction requirements for the
environmental safety bill, where a post hoc Tukey test showed that they requested more
risk reduction than Independents (p < .037) and Democrats (p < .006). See Tables 1 and 2
and Figures 2 and 3 for descriptive statistics.
After taking into account the starting level of risk, ideological effects appeared for
the gun safety bill, with ideology having a significant effect on the amount of risk
reduction requested by the subject (F= 5.3(404), p<.005). Thus, Hypothesis 1 was only
partially supported, as the anticipated ideological effects appeared only with the gun
safety issue after controlling for initial levels of uncertainty.
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Table 1
Environmental Bill Adoption Likelihoods by Party ID and Desired Risk Reduction

Party ID
Dem
Dem
Dem
Repub
Repub
Repub
Ind
Ind
Ind

Initial Risk
Level
Low
Medium
High
Low
Medium
High
Low
Medium
High

n
51
55
63
47
55
53
25
29
31

Mean
Likelihood
of Adoption
75.25
55.80
31.87
76.28
54.78
39.19
69.88
59.34
34.45
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Mean
Reduction
in Risk
7.88
39.64
65.06
8.13
38.75
64.38
7.20
31.97
52.97

Diff from
Overall
Mean
Likelihood
1.45
-0.84
-3.30
2.47
-1.86
4.02
-3.92
2.70
-0.72

Diff from
Overall
Mean
Reduction
0.15
2.85
4.26
0.39
1.96
3.57
-0.54
-4.82
-7.84

Environmental Cleanup
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Low Risk Low Risk Low Risk Medium Medium Medium High Risk High Risk High Risk
Risk
Risk
Risk
Dem

Repub

Ind

Dem

Repub

Mean Likelihood of Signing Bill

Ind

Dem

Repub

Ind

Mean Reduction Sought

Figure 2. Mean likelihood of policy adoption and risk reduction sought for environmental
cleanup. Likelihood of adoption generally mirrored the initially presented risk level.
Table 2
Gun Safety Bill Adoption Likelihoods by Party ID and Desired Risk Reduction
Diff from
Initial Risk
Mean
Mean
Overall Mean
Party ID
Level
n
Likelihood Reduction
Likelihood
Dem
Low
44
83.89
7.84
2.91
Dem
Medium
57
57.51
39.75
-3.64
Dem
High
68
42.35
54.76
1.50
Repub
Low
46
78.87
8.30
-2.11
Repub
Medium
52
58.12
41.23
-3.04
Repub
High
57
28.28
63.26
-12.57
Ind
Low
27
80.19
7.44
-0.80
Ind
Medium
35
67.83
39.60
6.68
Ind
High
23
51.91
53.78
11.06
92

Diff from
Overall Mean
Reduction
-0.02
-0.44
-2.51
0.44
1.04
5.99
-0.42
-0.60
-3.49

Gun Safety
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Low Risk Low Risk Low Risk Medium Medium Medium High Risk High Risk High Risk
Risk
Risk
Risk
Dem

Repub

Ind

Dem

Mean Likelihood

Repub

Ind

Dem

Repub

Ind

Mean Reduction

Figure 3. Mean likelihood of policy adoption and risk reduction sought for gun safety
issue. Republicans were generally less likely to seek to adopt gun control legislation and
sought more risk reduction before preferring it over hospital funding.

To what extent does holding the subject accountable interact with political
ideology to increase or decrease the amount of cognitive closure (as measured as risk
reduction) desired by the subject? The interactions were not significant, thus the effects
of accountability and political ideology were orthogonal even after controlling for initial
level of risk. Accountability appeared to increase the amount of closure sought in the gun
safety scenario (p = 0.01) as well as for the environmental clean-up scenario, although in
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the latter case accountability was only marginally significant (p = .075). See Tables 3 and
4 for ANOVA results. These results generally support Hypotheses 2 and 3, which posited
that accountability would exacerbate the amount of risk reduction sought regardless of
political ideology.
Table 3
ANOVA for Accountability, Initial Risk and Ideology on Risk Reduction Sought for
Environmental Clean-up Issue
Df
Accountable
1
Initial Risk Level
2
Party ID
2
Accountable * Party ID
2
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05

SS
990
197469
3244
1256

MS
990
98735
1622
628

F
3.19
318.63
5.24
2.03

Pr(>F)
0.075
0.001***
0.006**
0.133

Table 4
ANOVA for Accountability, Initial Risk and Ideology on Risk Reduction Sought for Gun
Safety Issue
Df
Accountable
1
Initial Risk Level
2
Party ID
2
Accountable * Party ID
2
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05

SS
2992
168949
1621
453

MS
2992
84474
811
227

F
6.53
184.30
1.77
0.49

Pr(>F)
0.011*
0.001***
0.172
0.61

Is initial preference for a policy influenced by an interaction between political
ideology and accountability (i.e., does holding someone accountable make them more
likely to adopt politically congruent policies)? The results from the environmental cleanup issue do not support Hypothesis 4, as the interactions were not significant; however,
the results from the gun safety issue showed a marginally significant (p<.068) interaction
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between accountability and ideology on the likelihood of supporting the policy. A post
hoc Tukey test showed that these marginally significant effects were primarily the result
of accountable Independents (p = 0.16) and accountable Democrats (p = 0.11) preferring
less reduction in uncertainty than non-accountable Republicans. Thus, there is partial
support for Hypothesis 4, which would benefit from further investigation via follow-on
experiments. See Tables 5 and 6 for full ANOVA results.
Table 5
ANOVA for Accountability, Initial Risk and Ideology on Initial Likelihood of Adoption for
Environmental Clean-up Issue
Df
Accountable
Initial Risk Level
Party ID
Accountable * Party ID
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05

SS
1
2
2
2

84
105441
553
589

MS
84
52720
277
294

F
0.181
113.9
0.598
0.636

Pr(>F)
0.671
0.001***
0.551
0.530

Table 6
ANOVA for Accountability, Initial Risk and Ideology on Initial Likelihood of Adoption for
Gun Safety Issue
Df
Accountable
Initial Risk Level
Party ID
Accountable * Party ID
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05

SS
1
2
2
2

1592
118344
7839
3121

MS
1592
59172
3919
1560

F
2.763
102.668
6.8
2.708

Pr(>F)
0.097
0.001***
0.001***
0.068

Discussion
The results from Study 3 mostly support the idea that holding subjects
accountable to the public can exacerbate the extent to which they prefer policies
congruent with their political beliefs, regardless of the actual efficacy of such policies.
Subjects were more likely to adopt ideologically-congruent policies when they were held
95

accountable for their actions. Subjects tolerated more risk for politically congruent
policies than incongruent ones, and accountability pressures mostly exacerbated such
effects. These findings support Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. While there is only weak support
for Hypothesis 4 and therefore the full model, it is possible that a more politically salient
issue, such as abortion rights or affirmative action policy, could draw out a stronger
interaction between accountability and political ideology on the likelihood to support and
the amount of risk reduction sought for a politically congruent policy.
Likewise, the use of student samples for this study may understate the size of
effects from accountability and ideology. First, students who are working on
undergraduate degrees, and specifically those who were a part of this sample (recruited
from mostly selective universities with highly active political organizations), may differ
from their ideological cohort in ways that tamp down the observed effects. Second,
because these students were recruited from political email lists, they may have been
primed to answer in more temperate ways, recognizing that their answers would likely be
scrutinized by someone who knows their political affiliation. Future work should, at a
minimum, attempt to capture ideology in a more granular way than by using political
affiliation as a proxy. It should also strive to use a more representative sample of political
ideologues—perhaps in a manner similar to what polling organizations such as Pew
Research do when composing their representative samples.
There is at least some empirical basis to expect the results in this study. Recent
work by Daniel Kahan (2016, 2017) demonstrates the strength of political ideology and
identity on information processing. In fact, Kahan and Corbin (2016) found that the most
actively open-minded individuals within their ideological camps (liberal or conservative)
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were also the most polarized in terms of their beliefs on climate change. We should not
only expect limits on how much additional information processing and gathering we can
push through accountability mechanisms; we should also expect that, at some point, that
additional processing will merely reinforce existing beliefs. Simply holding people
accountable for their thinking will make them more rational or objective forecasters,
when it could in fact make them more incoherent and polarized instead. Other methods
must be sought out to improve the quality of reasoning and coherence of thought,
especially when highly polarized political issues are involved.
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CHAPTER 4
Accountability and Overcoming Cognitive Interference Effects
ABSTRACT
When people are faced with highly ambiguous images, they tend to remain uncertain
about what they are seeing even as the images are gradually brought into focus. People
are slow to let go of their uncertainty. Similarly, people tend to underestimate the rate of
change in the environment when they are in the midst of an event, improperly updating
their beliefs as new information warrants. Can increases in deliberate processing, spurred
by accountability pressures, lead people to more quickly recognize an outcome while
resisting overly volatile updating? In this series of interrelated experiments, subjects were
asked about the probability of a referendum succeeding in a fictional country after being
presented with seven pieces of evidence (news updates about the election). In the first
experiment, subjects viewed these news updates in a purely qualitative format (without
numeric probabilities associated with the data). Subjects in the second experiment saw
the evidence accompanied with base rate information, which allowed for Bayesian
updating. Holding subjects accountable for the reasons supporting their judgments led to
quicker and more accurate recognition of eventual outcomes and updating that was
significantly closer to Bayesian norms.
Keywords: cognitive interference, Bayesian reasoning, process accountability
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Introduction
People are frequently blindsided by changing events. Popular culture has many
different names for this familiar phenomenon: terms referring to indifference to change
while the change is occurring include the “boiling frog” effect or “creeping” normality
(Handy, 1995) and using incremental change to lull a target into a non-preferred policy
position is referred to as “salami tactics” (Lieberthal, 2005). Conversely, people generally
cover their dissonant tracks by defaulting to hindsight bias or creeping determinism.
Instead of remembering the uncertainty that came with initial forecasts and judgments,
events seem more probable— or, at the extremes, inevitable— once an outcome is known
(Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, & Harkness, 1981; Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991;
Fischhoff, 1975; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975). Not anticipating or recognizing change is a
topic frequently discussed by judgment and decision-making scholars because it
demonstrates deviation from normative guidelines for integrating new information with
existing beliefs.
There are several candidate theories for this phenomenon, each of which would
predict that people might not thoroughly foresee or understand incremental change from
moment to moment and in the aggregate. One explanation is informational: people have a
tendency to assimilate information in a biased way. If one’s starting position is that
change will not occur, then only evidence to that effect will be readily accepted into
existing mental models of the world (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Biased assimilation is
essentially bipolar: if one’s starting position is that change will occur, then overweighting
the evidentiary value of new information suggesting change might occur. Other
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explanations include the tendency towards status quo bias where “no change” is a
“default” mental setting (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Samuelson & Zeckhauser,
1988). At a more micro-level, anchoring bias operates, likely the result of selective
accessibility (Furnham & Boo, 2011; Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Kahneman, 1992;
Mussweiler, Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). When compared to
the normative standard of Bayes Theorem, people typically have trouble updating their
beliefs properly, making too large of updates in light of a strong prior probability, or too
small of updates in light of a weak prior probability (Edwards, 1968; Massey & Wu,
2005; Mellers, Schwartz, & Cooke, 1998).
Misinterpreting incremental change can also be due to informational pseudodiagnosticity (Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney, & Schiavo, 1979) – that is, newly received
information could be non-diagnostic or minimally-diagnostic. Within cognitive and
perceptual psychology, this has sometimes been referred to as perceptual interference
(Bruner & Potter, 1964). Bruner and Potter (1964) showed that subjects trying to visually
identify objects became progressively worse as initial levels of blurriness were increased.
Subjects saw objects as they were gradually brought into focus and those who saw
extremely blurry objects initially had greater difficulty correctly identifying the objects.
Bruner and Potter’s findings suggest that more initial uncertainty leads subjects to
interpret additional information as less diagnostic. Bruner and Potter’s explanation for
subject behavior centered around the additional hypothesis testing that subjects had to do
in order to correctly ascertain the identity of the object. However, more recent research
has called that explanation into question while still replicating the perceptual interference
effects (Snodgrass & Hirshman, 1991). This more recent work has focused on transient
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activation or priming as an explanatory mechanism, akin to a kind of anchoring on
uncertainty.
While perceptual interference has been briefly addressed in the cognitive
psychology literature, it has received almost zero attention in the domain of judgment and
decision-making. Given the robustness of the other heuristics and biases mentioned
earlier, we might expect cognitive interference effects when people are integrating
information that demonstrates incremental change.
One normatively prescribed way that high and low starting levels of certainty can
be interpreted is as strong vs. weak priors. A strong prior, in this case, refers to a small
degree of first-order uncertainty, whereas a weak prior refers to a high degree of firstorder uncertainty. According to Bayes theorem, the same piece of evidence should have
more sway in the low certainty (weak prior) condition than in the high certainty (strong
prior) condition (Augenblick & Rabin, 2013). Bruner and Potter’s results run opposite to
this prediction, giving a reasonable basis for calling this behavior an “error” which
accountability mechanisms can correct.
From this, we derive the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: When subjects encounter a strong prior, they will make large
updates to their beliefs after exposure to new stimuli, relative to subjects that
initially encounter a weak prior.
Hypothesis 2: When subjects encounter a weak prior, they will make small
updates to their beliefs after exposure to new stimuli, relative to subjects that
initially encounter a strong prior.
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Can these cognitive interference effects be overcome by additional deliberate
processing? Other scholars have successfully debiased hindsight effects and status quo
bias with strategies such as “considering the opposite” (Arkes et al., 1988; Hoffrage et al.,
2000). Still others have shown that holding subjects accountable for their judgments has
also improved the quality of judgments (Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989;
Tetlock & Kim, 1987). Some types of process accountability which spur greater levels of
deliberate processing should thus help mitigate this error. Control subjects will put less
weight on evidence in the face of a weak prior and a lot of emphasis on evidence when
facing a strong prior—contrary to the prescriptions of Bayes’ theorem. When subjects are
accountable, this effect should be flipped, which suggests that conscious deliberation
helps participants to act like naïve Bayesians.
From this, we derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Process accountability reduces the magnitude of cognitive
interference effects, such that probabilistic estimates made under conditions of
high and low certainty will have less error.

Method
Procedure and Subjects
The study was conducted via two experiments. Both experiments were full
factorial 2x2 designs: accountable vs. not accountable and strong vs. weak prior
probability. In Experiment 1 (N=246), undergraduate subjects were recruited and
completed the experiment for class credit. Over 98% of the subjects were between the
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ages of 18-24, the sample was 57% female and 54% Caucasian. In Experiment 2
(N=366), undergraduate subjects were recruited and also completed the experiment for
class credit. Over 99% of the subjects were between the ages of 18-24, the sample was
59% female and 50% Caucasian.
Design
In both experiments, subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four
conditions and presented the same scenario based on the 2014 Scottish referendum for
independence. The referendum was a popular vote which would decide whether Scotland
would remain a part of the United Kingdom. This referendum resulted in a victory for
those who held the “anti-independence” or status quo position.
Seven news items from the referendum were fictionalized and presented to
subjects in the same order that they occurred in the real world. In Experiment 1, subjects
in the weak prior condition were told that the chances of the “pro-independence” camp
winning the referendum were 50/50, but that there were many weeks until the vote was to
take place. Those in the strong prior condition were told that the “anti-independence”
camp had a significant lead over the “pro-independence” camp. The same initial
information was presented to subjects in Experiment 2, along with numeric probabilities.
Subjects were informed that the chances of the “pro-independence” camp winning were
50% in the weak prior condition and 90% in the strong prior condition.
In both experiments, subjects were subsequently presented with the same seven
pieces of evidence, in the same order, and were asked for likelihood estimates (numeric)
on whether the “pro-independence” camp would win the referendum after each new piece
of evidence was presented. In the accountable conditions, subjects were asked to explain
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the reasoning behind their estimates. After viewing a piece of evidence, subjects
encountered a text box that posed the question, “Why did you assign the probability that
you assigned? Please explain your rationale in a sentence or more.” Subjects in the
accountable conditions saw this query and text box a total of seven times. In Experiment
1, subjects were simply given the textual information and left on their own to decide what
would be reasonable probability estimates. In Experiment 2, subjects received base rate
information (other referendums that have occurred within the country of Apple)
regarding the probability of the referendum being successful, given that they had just
viewed a new piece of information. From this information, subjects could conduct
Bayesian inference and calculate a normatively correct answer per Bayes theorem, if they
so chose. For the complete study materials, see the methodological appendix for Study 4.
Results
Experiment 1
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we examined how much a participant’s judgment
shifted in response to each new piece of evidence. We calculated the average change in
response to new information (on an absolute basis, since the estimate could go up or
down) between a participant’s initial and final probabilistic estimates. We used
percentage change because subjects in the strong prior condition had less “room” to move
their estimates upwards, while those in the weak prior condition had more “room” for
shifting their estimates up or down. We refer to this measure as average change in belief.
A low change in belief suggests that a participant was not swayed much by new evidence,
sticking closely with their original estimate. In contrast, a high change in belief suggests
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that a participant was significantly influenced by new evidence, deviating from their
original estimate.
We first sought to examine whether strength of prior affected belief updating
behavior. A two-sample t-test was conducted on average change in belief to see if there
was a significant difference in change in belief between the weak and strong prior
conditions. Beliefs in the strong prior condition were more labile, averaging 11% shifts
from the start to the end of the experiment, compared to nearly negligible shifts from
beginning to end for the low prior participants (M = 0.3%). Both strong prior and weak
prior subjects exhibited cognitive interference effects; strong prior subjects shifted wildly
and those initially encountering weak priors hardly shifted at all. These results are
consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. See Table 1.
Table 1
T-Test of Average Change in Beliefs by Condition Aggregating Percent Changes After
Being Presented with Each New Piece of Evidence in Experiment 1
Condition
Weak Prior
Strong Prior

M
Average
Change 0.3%
(%)

n

M

n

123

11.11%

123

95%
Confidence
Interval
-12.73, 10.10

t

df

p

178.38 <0.001***
17.135

***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05

To gain a deeper understanding of the effect of certainty on belief updating throughout
the course of the experiment, t-tests were conducted on changes to the reported
probability of referendum success for each time a subject received a new piece of
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evidence between the two conditions. The results from this examination show that
changes in reported probability by condition were not significant, with the exception of
the shifts from starting level of probability (90% in the strong prior condition and 50% in
the weak prior condition) after viewing Evidence 1. See Table 2 and Figure 1.

Table 2
T-Tests of Average Percent Change in Beliefs by Strength of Prior After Each Being
Presented With New Evidence in Experiment 1
Condition
Weak Prior
Strong Prior
Mean
Mean
%
n
%
n

95% Confidence
Interval

t

df

p

After viewing
evidence 1

8.2

123

47.5

123

-41.86, -36.71

-30.1

233.64

.001***

After viewing
evidence 2

10.6

123

10.5

123

-2.31, 2.38

0.03

267.82

.974

After viewing
evidence 3

11.9

123

13.9

123

-5.33, 1.08

-1.3

259.80

.193

After viewing
evidence 4

13.7

123

14.7

123

-4.16, 2.17

-0.61

269.15

.537

After viewing
evidence 5

9.3

123

9.2

123

-2.52, 2.71

0.06

271.98

.945

After viewing
evidence 6

10.4

123

9.0

123

-0.78, 3.48

1.25

264.09

.213

After viewing
evidence 7

7.2

123

6.4

123

-1.28, 2.85

0.74

261.76

.455

***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05
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Figure 1. Average percent changes (absolute) in probability estimates in Experiment 1
from presentation of one piece of evidence to the next, starting with shift from evidence 1
to 2. Subjects in the strong prior condition reacted more strongly to new information than
subjects in the weak prior condition; however, the differences here were not significant,
with the exception of shifts from initial starting probability to estimate after evidence 1.
How does accountability influence belief-updating behavior? To test Hypothesis 3, we
ran an analysis of variance of the interaction between type of prior and accountability on
total change in belief of reported probability of referendum success from the beginning of
the experiment to the end. The beliefs of accountable subjects in the strong prior
condition were less labile than those in the weak prior condition, providing partial
support to Hypothesis 3. See Table 3.
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Table 3
ANOVA of Average Change in Belief, Strength of Prior, and Accountability with
Interaction Term in Experiment 1
Source

Df

SS

MS

F

Pr(>F)

Strength of Prior
Accountability
Prior * Accountability
Residuals

1
1
1
284

0
45
91
6222

0.34
44.95
90.92
21.91

0.02
2.05
4.42

0.901
0.153
0.04*

***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05
The interaction can be more clearly seen graphically. A strong prior alone, when
compared to a weak prior, makes participants deviate more from their original estimate,
per Table 1. However, when accountability is introduced, we see that those in the weak
prior condition began to deviate more, while those in the strong prior condition deviated
less. These data support Hypothesis 3. Accountability did reduce the magnitude of
cognitive interference effects in both the strong and weak prior conditions. See Figure 2.
For a graphical representation of how subjects reacted after viewing each piece of
evidence, see Figure 3.
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Figure 2. Accountability effects interact with strength of prior in Experiment 1. Holding
subjects accountable decreased the size of the belief updates in the strong prior scenario
and increased the size of their updates in the weak prior scenario. Error bars represent
standard errors.
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Figure 3. Accountability effects interact with strength of prior in Experiment 1. Holding
subjects accountable decreased the size of the belief updates in the strong prior scenario
and increased the size of their updates in the weak prior scenario.

In the no-accountability (control) condition, participants make the error of
overweighting the diagnostic value of new evidence against a strong prior and
underweighting it when encountering a weak prior. In the accountability conditions, this
behavior switches to match the normative prescription: to put more stock in new evidence
when viewed in light of a weak prior versus a strong prior.
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Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, subjects were free to assign probabilities as best they saw fit. In
Experiment 2, belief updating based on Bayesian inference served as a normative
benchmark for subjects. Subjects were provided with base rate information which they
could use to derive properly updated estimates. To again test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we
examined the difference between a participant’s initial and final probabilistic estimate. A
two-sample t-test was conducted on average change in belief to see if there was a
significant difference in change in belief between the low and high certainty conditions.
Subjects in the strong prior condition were more volatile, averaging 3% shifts from the
start to the end of the experiment compared to nearly negligible shifts from beginning to
end for the low certainty participants. So, while weak prior condition subjects did exhibit
behavior consistent with Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 1 was again unsupported. See Table 4.

Table 4
T-Test of Average Absolute Percent Change in Beliefs by Condition Aggregating Percent
Changes After Being Presented with Each New Piece of Evidence in Experiment 2
Condition
Weak Prior

Avg
Percent
Change
(absolute)

Mean
%
1.07

Strong Prior

n

Mean
%

178

1.30

n

95%
Confidence
Interval

t

df

188

-0.35, -0.12

-3.92

364

***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05
To gain a deeper understanding of the effect of certainty on belief updating throughout
the course of Experiment 2, t-tests were conducted on changes to the reported probability
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p
<.001
***

of referendum success for each time a subject received a new piece of evidence. The
results from this examination show that changes in reported probability by condition were
significantly different when updating beliefs after seeing evidence instance number 2. See
Table 5 and Figure 4.
Table 5
T-Test Average Change in Beliefs by Condition After Each Being Presented With New
Evidence in Experiment 2
Condition
Weak Prior
(Absolute
values)

Strong Prior
(Absolute
values)

Mean %

n

Mean %

n

95%
Confidence
Interval

After viewing
evidence 2

14.09

188

4.13

178

-0.34, -0.03

-2.34

214

0.02*

After viewing
evidence 3

22.34

188

15.38

178

-0.16, 0.02

-1.57

345

0.12

After viewing
evidence 4

172.52

188

56.56

178

-0.84, 3.16

1.15

181

0.25

After viewing
evidence 5

88.79

188

114.08

178

-0.88, 0.37

-0.80

334

0.42

After viewing
evidence 6

5.01

188

7.37

178

-0.38, 0.33

-0.13

285

0.89

After viewing
evidence 7

80.21

188

55.36

178

-1.06, 0.57

-0.60

307

0.55

***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05
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t

df

p

Figure 4. Average percent change in probability estimates in Experiment 2. In the weak
prior scenario, subjects reacted more strongly to evidence 4 and in the strong prior
scenario they reacted more strongly to evidence 5.

How does accountability influence belief updating behavior? To test Hypothesis 3 again,
we ran an analysis of variance of the interaction between strength of prior and
accountability on total change in belief of reported probability of referendum success
from the beginning of the experiment to the end. Accountable subjects who were
provided with a strong prior made less volatile estimates providing partial support to
Hypothesis 3. See Table 3.
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Table 6
ANOVA of Average Change in Belief, Strength of Prior,
and Accountability with Interaction Term in Experiment 2
Source

Df

SS

MS

F

Pr(>F)

Strength of Prior
Accountability
Prior *
Accountability
Residuals

1
1

0.012
0.029
0.029

0.0117
0.029

1.55
3.82

0.029

3.87

0.214
0.051
0.050*

2.737

0.00756

1
362

***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05
The interaction can be more clearly seen graphically. Strong prior alone, when compared
to a weak prior, is associated with participants deviating more from each estimate, per
Experiment 1. However, when held accountable, those in the strong prior condition, on
average, deviated less; however, weak prior subjects (also accountable) did not deviate
more, on average. In Experiment 2, this pattern partially supports Hypothesis 3.
Accountability did reduce the magnitude of cognitive interference effects, but only when
participants were in a condition of strong prior. In Experiment 2, subjects in the weak
prior condition did not experience a significant exacerbation of belief shifting in
judgments when held accountable. See Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Accountability effects interact with strength of prior in Experiment 2. Weak
prior on the right and strong prior on the left. Accountability led to larger updates in the
weak prior scenario and smaller updates in the strong prior scenario.

How did subjects perform compared to an ideal observer updating according to
Bayes’ theorem? The major change in belief from optimally Bayesian behavior came
when subjects encountered evidence 3, updating their beliefs after considering evidence
2. See Figure 6. The change in belief for those who were held accountable in the strong
prior condition was much less than it was for those in the weak prior condition.
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Figure 6. Comparing actual belief updating to Bayesian inference ideal in Experiment 2.
In the weak prior scenario (purple dashed line), belief updates should be larger while in
the strong prior scenario (yellow dashed line), belief updates should be smaller.
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Figure 7. Comparing accountable subjects to non-accountable subjects in Experiment 2.
In the weak prior no accountability scenario (blue dashed line), belief updates were
larger than the accountable subjects (blue solid line) while in the strong prior
accountable scenario (red solid line), belief updates were smaller in 4 out of 7 instances.

Figure 6 illustrates how subjects should behave versus how they did behave when
encountering a weak or strong prior. When encountering a strong prior conveyed by a
higher starting level of certainty, subjects should have shifted their beliefs in a more
gradual manner (i.e., the dashed yellow is less strongly influenced by evidence than the
dashed purple line). Figure 7 illustrates how subjects in the strong prior accountable
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condition behaved in a more Bayesian manner while subjects in the weak prior
accountable condition did not. Accountability did not have consistent effects in
Experiment 2.
Another way of examining this difference is by doing a paired regression
coefficients analysis. I examined whether subjects in the strong prior condition made
more gradual updates than those in in the weak prior condition. This is not the case, as
seen by the positive values in the last column of Table 7. Subjects did not behave in an
optimally Bayesian way.
Table 7
Paired Regression Coefficients Comparison Between Weak vs. Strong Prior Conditions
Predicting Changes in Beliefs After Viewing Each Piece of Evidence

After Ev 1
After Ev 2
After Ev 3
After Ev 4
After Ev 5
After Ev 6
After Ev 7

Weak Prior
Coeff (abs)
0.061
0.059
0.084
0.027
0.006
0.077
0.039

Strong Prior
Coeff (abs)
0.019
0.070
0.134
0.055
0.086
0.136
0.033

Difference
-0.042
0.011
0.050
0.028
0.080
0.059
-0.006

Based on these results, it appears that accountability’s effect on belief updating is not
sufficient to overcome the natural tendency of not updating in a Bayesian manner. In the
case of subjects starting with a weak prior, accountability led to larger magnitude updates
in 4 out of 7 belief update episodes; and in the case of starting with a strong prior, being
accountable led to smaller magnitude updates in 4 out of 7 belief update episodes. See
Table 8.
118

Table 8
Paired Regression Coefficients Comparison Between Weak vs. Strong Priors Conditions
w/ and w/o Accountability

After Ev 1
After Ev 2
After Ev 3
After Ev 4
After Ev 5
After Ev 6
After Ev 7

Weak Prior Coeff (abs)
No Acc
Acc
0.067
0.076
0.025
0.044
0.068
0.069
0.024
0.014
0.048
0.028
0.000
0.129
0.097
0.024

Strong Prior Coeff (abs)
No Acc
Acc
0.024
0.012
0.057
0.104
0.129
0.143
0.061
0.045
0.095
0.081
0.151
0.095
0.027
0.052

Weak
Diff

Strong
Diff

0.008
0.018
0.001
-0.010
-0.020
0.129
-0.073

-0.012
0.047
0.015
-0.016
-0.014
-0.057
0.025

Conclusion
In general, there is support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, which posited that subjects
would update too strongly after encountering a strong prior and too weakly after
encountering a weak prior. However, the results of these two experiments present a
mixed picture for the ability of process accounting to help overcome cognitive
interference effects. Process accountable subjects were able to mitigate the effects of
cognitive interference consistently in Experiment 1 but only in the case of encountering a
strong prior in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, accountable subjects who encountered a
weak prior did not make larger magnitude shifts in beliefs. In large part, we replicated the
cognitive interference effects and showed accountability to be helpful, but not a panacea.
These results show how hard it is for people to be Bayesian processors of
information and to update beliefs in a manner that is close to Bayesian standards. Process
accountability is not capable of helping in all instances, although one could consider the
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results from these two studies to be the lower bound limit on accountability effects, since
the intervention was so minimal. Future work should focus on just how much closer
people can approach the Bayesian standard when they are incentivized to do so, and feel
the pressure to perform in a more deliberate and considered manner.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION
Accountability may be an inevitable feature of social life, but the paradoxical
popular picture painted of it shows a polarized perception of its efficacy. Accountability
system perception sometimes depends on ideological factors, which predict when liberals
and conservatives prefer process or outcome accounting (Tetlock, Vieider, Patil, & Grant,
2013). More generally, the popular rhetoric often simply calls for “more of it” (usually
when things have gone wrong) and the targets of accountability often levy responses of
“we have enough already.” But accountability need not always be used as a blunt
instrument for forced compliance. The anticipation of being of held responsible, either for
process or outcomes, can have effects on judgments and decisions that are desirable or
less than desirable depending on the specific context of task for which responsibility must
be taken. The key takeaway from the collection of studies presented here is that
accountability type should be calibrated to match the situations that the accountable find
themselves in.
One of these situational contexts is environmental validity, or the extent to which
there is predictability. When there is a tight coupling between following a process and
achieving the desired aims, finding and following the process should outperform other
forms of accountability (and not being held accountable). However, if an environment is
sufficiently random, we should expect process accountability to degrade performance
since the hunt for non-existent “best practices” leads to wasted effort and errors of
commission. The dual-edged nature of process accountability became evident from the
results of Study 1. The key is for leaders, decision-makers, and employees alike to
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recognize and gauge just how much randomness there is in the operating environment
and design accountability systems accordingly, to the extent that doing so is possible.
Another important situational context is the political environment. Anticipation of
evaluation by the outcome-biased public can lead policymakers to choices that are
considered sub-optimal by decision theorists. Researchers and scientists have encouraged
policymakers to use numeric probabilities because they are more precise, but vague
verbal ones can offer a buffer against an unfair evaluation by voters. Study 2 showed that
by considering the alternative functions of probabilistic statements, such as political
signaling, the precision that comes along with numeric probabilities does not necessarily
hold the highest utility value. Less defensible are the shifts in the amount of uncertainty
tolerated for ideologically congruent policy choices. Study 3 shows how accountability
pressure can exacerbate our tendency to prefer policies consistent with our ideological
beliefs, despite the value (positive or negative) associated with those policies.
Sometimes, holding people accountable for their reasoning is not enough to
overcome biases in thinking. Study 4 showed that accountability reduced cognitive
interference effects and improved Bayesian thinking only some of the time. Previous
research showed that because being a proper Bayesian can be difficult, without prior
instruction on how to do it, simply mixing in more deliberate processing isn’t enough to
make the Bayesian cake rise.
This dissertation is intended to start a conversation on how situations can shape
the kinds of accountability systems we design. For example, in Study 1, prescriptions of
process or outcome systems depend on the randomness of the environment encountered –
but what if there is little or no feedback on the level of randomness (i.e., vast temporal
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distance between event and outcome, such as starting a dissertation and defending it), or
when the feedback is simply so noisy or inconsistent that it is impossible to say? Perhaps,
as suggested by Chang et al. (2017), the solution is to prescribe a hybrid accountability
approach and see if it generates both faster recognition of patterns while tamping down
error commission in random environments. Depending on the environment, a hybrid
approach could be the best of both worlds—or the worst—and we won’t know until we
test. A follow-up to Study 1 would include extending the total number of trials to see if
the observed divergence in effects holds up and also to test to see if the learning effects of
outcome vs. process remain stable. In Study 2, another reason posited for why decisionmakers should use numeric probabilities is that they are better able to learn from more
granular feedback. Yet, to date, no one has conducted a study demonstrating that numeric
probabilities lead to improved levels of learning (such as becoming better calibrated at
making estimates)—essentially that there are other normatively justifiable reasons for
preferring numeric probabilities over verbal ones.
There are more than a few other contexts to explore and many more if we want to
develop a comprehensive theory regarding the “ecological” context of accountability.
One such contextual element is time pressure. Not often a deliberately manipulated
variable in experiments (unless it is the experimental variable in question), time pressure
is nevertheless as ubiquitous as accountability. No one can escape the march of time, yet
time pressure has become a neglected element of psychological experimentation
(Svenson & Maule, 1993). Yet, process accountability proponents, backed by empirical
data collected in the lab that supports their position, see process as an unalloyed good.
However, after taking time pressure into account, the downsides of following or
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anticipating evaluation for process becomes clear. Perhaps a myopic focus on process
steps ultimately leads to judgments and decisions that are incomplete or too late.
Executing a process can also be expensive in terms of cognitive and time resources—and
it is possible that the recommended process is not the best one that there is or even very
good. Being accountable for outcomes could reveal alternative, faster and better
pathways to achieving desired goals. Such exploration would be limited by strict process
adherence.
A second situational component has to do with the incentives found in
accountability systems, chiefly the repercussions of not following through with
accountability dictates. Within the accountability literature, laboratory experiments
typically do not punish subjects or subject them to costs, yet in the real-world, noncompliance can lead to the loss of property, a job, and sometimes even life. Within
reason, laboratory experiments can begin to explore how costs and punishments
associated with accountability systems influence how people perform.
A third potential study continuation is to connect how accountability systems and
environmental validity interact with a group’s error propensity. Groups make many of the
most consequential decisions in modern society. Psychologists and behavioral economists
have long studied the risk propensities of individuals and how people behave in risky
situations (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984). Earlier and relatively inconclusive work
on the “risky shift” phenomenon cataloged instances where individuals make more risky
choices when put into groups (Teger & Pruitt, 1967; Wallach & Kogan, 1965; Wallach,
Kogan, & Bem, 1962; Yates, 1992; Zajonc, Wolosin, Wolosin, & Loh, 1970; Zajonc,
Wolosin, Wolosin, & Sherman, 1968). Group discussion and familiarization were
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identified as drivers of this behavior, which could also induce “cautious” shifts in some
cases (Fraser, 1971; Fraser, Gouge, & Billig, 1971; Stroebe & Fraser, 1971). Others
contested these findings by showing that some results were experimentally induced
(Willems & Clark III, 1969).
Research into group polarization subsumed the risky and cautious shift research
program, as polarization of decision-making in groups encompassed the specific cases of
changing risk tolerances (Isenberg, 1986; Myers & Lamm, 1976; Zuber, Crott, & Werner,
1992). Group polarization is said to have occurred when group processes push the initial
position of a group further in the direction of that position (Isenberg, 1986). In essence,
group processes cause group opinions to become more extreme (Sia, Tan, & Wei, 2002).
Group polarization phenomenon is of interest because it is an example where individual
opinions are counter-conformist, in that instead of converging on the group average, the
group’s opinions are pushed away from it (Isenberg, 1986). Group polarization explains
the existence of non-optimal group decisions as a result of social processes such as the
Abilene Paradox and is consistent with the research on pluralistic ignorance. Researchers
have found that group opinions shift as a result of persuasive argumentation, social
comparison processes, and power distribution inequality among group members, and
attentional focus on group norms and membership (Friedkin, 1999; Hinsz & Davis, 1984;
Mackie, 1986; Spears, Lea, & Lee, 1990).
Overall, limited work has been done in showing how groups balance the risks of
errors of omission and commission, since the focus has been on the mechanisms
underlying each specific kind of error propensity. An extension of Study 1 would allow
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us to test whether and which types of accountability systems can improve group
performance.
Finally, we should also seek to answer how individual differences influence the
ways people behave under accountability, since some people thrive and others struggle to
survive under accountability. Better understanding of individual differences in
performance might lead to better-calibrated systems of accountability at the individual
level. In study 1 of the dissertation, individuals who scored highly on measures of AOMT
performed better under conditions of process accountability than less open-minded
individuals under conditions of accountability, even when average performance in the
process condition was lower than that under outcome. This potentially occurs because
subjects who score highly on open-mindedness are better able to flexibly move away
from strict versions of process accountability that lead to unhelpful attentional narrowing.
AOMT is just one of the individual differences that could shape how people operate
under different accountability schemes. A keener understanding of who thrives, who
survives, and who wilts under different forms of accountability can also lead to better
calibrated rule regimes.

The Big Picture
To date, studies of accountability have focused on “small” applications of a
psychological force that tends to produce medium to large effects on participants.
Whether it be hiring a hypothetical candidate, or a fictional scenario determining
financial aid awards, or figuring out which hypothetical fund to invest in, many of these
laboratory examinations of the impact of being held accountable feature tasks that have

126

an ex ante correct answer. In a recent review of accountability studies that encompassed a
total of 187 experiments, over 70% of them tested process accountability and a great
many of those included tasks where the experimenters knew or invented the right answer.
That, of course, is not usually the case in the real world, where uncertainty is ever
present. So while the accountability literature certainly rates highly on some forms of
validity (chiefly construct and internal validity), it is at least somewhat lacking in external
validity. The disconnect here can be a narrow river or a wide gulf depending on which
perspective is taken—certainly the popular rhetoric regarding the efficacy of
accountability has not been much impacted by the nuanced and clever experiments that
have taken place thus far. While there have been some nascent attempts to bridge this
divide, Flinders (2014) notes that the future of accountability studies depends on how
societally relevant it is and states, “at the core of this debate is a concern that in recent
decades the incentives surrounding academic life have emphasized esoteric specialization
and impenetrable publications over public engagement.”7
This series of studies has been, to the extent that they were successful, an exercise
in bridging the gap. For example, even if the experimenter knew ex ante which condition
would present itself in the London Quadrants task from Study 1, there still was no way of
guaranteeing the highest possible score on any attempt. In Studies 2, 3, and 4, participants
grappled with scenarios drawn from the real world, and in some cases pressures to make
decisions came from publics. Much latitude lies with the experimenter to develop
materials that are contextually rich. And this is not an argument for more field studies or
quasi-experiments—each methodology has its pluses and minuses. Laboratory studies
7

See also: Julie Beck, “The Challenges of Holding Government Accountable”, The Atlantic, January 2017.
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/01/government-accountability-psychology/512888/
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still provide clear advantages to the much messier environs of police departments,
military units, or year-long forecasting tournaments.
The insights from Study 1 are particularly useful to our understanding of the kinds
of accountability that might be helpful. Consider two cases: a police officer on patrol and
an intelligence analyst writing a report. There is a raging debate over whether officers
should wear body-worn cameras (BWC), essentially a form of extreme accountability via
close and persistent monitoring. Every move made by the officers is recorded. On most
days, police officers encounter fairly routine issues: traffic citations, responding to noise
complaints, etc. During these times, they are often called on to behave in a procedurally
consistent manner and following proper procedure is what is evaluated. However, in what
are fairly rare moments, police officers must decide whether someone is a threat or not.
Here, our recommendations diverge based on the likelihood of the perceived threat being
an actual threat. There are hundreds of cases annually of “officer involved shootings” and
in these cases, more than half of those who were shot by officers were armed while
around 5% were unarmed (and therefore likely not life-threatening). On the face of it, the
error rate demonstrates that officers are actually fairly well-versed at distinguishing
between real and not-real threats. However, the high-profile cases that have seized the
public consciousness (and rightfully so, given the egregious mistakes committed) have
led to calls for all police to be equipped with camera technology. One could imagine that
the overall impact might actually be harmful: officers might feel reticent to take
justifiable action because of potential outcome bias on the part of the public. The overall
effect might be more criminals getting away with crime and reduced officer safety, rather
than the positive accountability effects (e.g., better judgment and threat identification)
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body-camera proponents believe will occur. This effect might be balanced out by camera
technology weeding out officers who know that they can no longer get away with
discriminatory and abusive behavior—but we should pay close attention to what the net
effect of the policy might be.
In a similar vein, intelligence analysts are mostly evaluated for following the
“right” process (Chang & Tetlock, 2016; Chang, Berdini, Mandel & Tetlock, 2017). Yet,
there is good reason to think that recent efforts to push analysts towards greater
consideration of outcome accountability might be warranted. Perhaps the target sets that
analysts deal with exhibit much more randomness and complexity than any process could
ever account for—or perhaps there are some target sets that are more predictable than
that. There might not be a one-size-fits-all accountability system that works for the entire
U.S. intelligence community: those trying to sniff out terrorist plots may be better served
by an outcome accountability regime than those trying to predict the future of the
European Union. For the most part, discussions around accountability systems are not
considerate of environmental concerns. Perhaps, with more research, they will be. One
can only hope that the research in this dissertation gets us started down this path.
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
Study 1
Elicitation Platforms for London Quadrants task
Individual Subject View

Subject View
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Study 2
Experiment 1 (Actor preferences for vague or precise probability expression)
Design: 2 x 2 factorial design, verbal vs. numeric probabilities, high likelihood vs. low
likelihood
Subjects were asked a series of questions via electronic survey
Section 1

High probability: On Christmas Eve, you receive intelligence reports that indicate that
terrorists are targeting US aircraft for a bomb attack.
Your advisors are pushing you to issue a warning to the American public. Choose the
preferred way you would like to express your warning to the public.
(Randomized order of presentation)
Numeric: Indicate there is a 70% probability that terrorists are targeting US aircraft for a
bomb attack.
Verbal: Indicate that terrorists are likely targeting US aircraft for a bomb attack.
Low probability: On Christmas Eve, you receive intelligence reports that indicate that
terrorists are targeting US aircraft for a bomb attack.
Your advisors are pushing you to issue a warning to the American public. Choose the
preferred way you would like to express your warning to the public.
(Randomized order of presentation)
Numeric: Indicate there is a 20% probability that terrorists are targeting US aircraft for a
bomb attack.
Verbal: Indicate that terrorists are unlikely to be targeting US aircraft for a bomb attack.
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Section 2
Question: You do not take this situation lightly. Your advisors believe the only way to
mitigate a devastating attack is to ground all passenger aircraft.
Based on the information you have received thus far, do you believe that you should take
this course of action? (Yes/No)
a. Yes: You decide to ground all aircraft.
b. No: You decide not to ground any aircraft.
Question: Do you feel that you were justified in taking this action? (1 not justified at all,
7 completely justified)
Text box: Why? (Please write any thoughts)

Section 3
After this stage, subjects are randomly assigned questions the outcome observed.
a. Action / Positive outcome (True Positive): You grounded all aircraft and several
terrorists were arrested on their way to Chicago O'Hare airport. The media reports that a
successful attack would have cost the U.S. economy $100 billion.
b. Action / Negative outcome (False Positive): You grounded all aircraft and the threat
was discovered to be a hoax. The media reports that the grounding of all flights cost the
U.S. economy $100 billion.
c. Inaction / Positive outcome (True Negative): You decided NOT to ground any aircraft
and the threat was discovered to be a hoax. The media reports that the grounding of all
flights cost the U.S. economy $100 billion.
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d. Inaction / Negative outcome (False Negative): You decided NOT to ground any
aircraft and a flight departing Chicago O'Hare airport exploded over Lake Michigan,
killing 298 individuals aboard. The media reports that the resulting panic from the
successful attack cost the U.S. economy $100 billion.

Question: To what extent do you feel you took the right action? (1 worst decision
possible, 7 best decision possible)
Text box: Why? (Please write any thoughts)
Experiment 2 General Public
Section 1
a. Verbal high: On Christmas Eve, the President of the United States announces that
intelligence reports indicate it is likely that terrorists are targeting US aircraft for a bomb
attack.
b. Numeric high: On Christmas Eve, the President of the United States announces that
intelligence reports indicate there is a 70% probability that terrorists are targeting US
aircraft for a bomb attack.
c. Verbal low: On Christmas Eve, the President of the United States announces that
intelligence reports indicate it is unlikely that terrorists are targeting US aircraft for a
bomb attack.
d. Numeric low: On Christmas Eve, the President of the United States announces that
intelligence reports indicate there is a 20% probability that terrorists are targeting US
aircraft for a bomb attack.
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Question: The President does not take this situation lightly. His advisors believe the only
way to mitigate a devastating attack is to ground all passenger aircraft. Based on the
information you have received thus far, how justified do you believe the President would
be if the President decided to ground all passenger aircraft in response to this threat? (1
completely unjustified / 7 completely justified)

Section 2

Then the subjects are randomly assigned into worlds where the President did or did not
take action:
a. Action: The President decided to ground all aircraft.
b. Inaction: The President decided not to ground any aircraft.
Question: To what extent is the President justified in taking this action? (1 completely
unjustified, 7 completely justified)
Text box: Why? (Please write any thoughts)
After this stage, subjects are randomly assigned questions the outcome observed.
Section 3

a. Action / Positive outcome (True Positive): The President grounded all aircraft and
several terrorists were arrested on their way to Chicago O'Hare airport. The media reports
that a successful attack would have cost the U.S. economy $100 billion.
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b. Action / Negative outcome (False Positive): The President grounded all aircraft and the
threat was discovered to be a hoax. The media reports that the grounding of all flights
cost the U.S. economy $100 billion.
c. Inaction / Positive outcome (True Negative): The President decided NOT to ground
any aircraft and the threat was discovered to be a hoax. The media reports that the
grounding of all flights cost the U.S. economy $100 billion.
d. Inaction / Negative outcome (False Negative): The President decided NOT to ground
any aircraft and a flight departing Chicago O'Hare airport exploded over Lake Michigan,
killing 298 individuals aboard. The media reports that the resulting panic from the
successful attack cost the U.S. economy $100 billion.
Question: To what extent did the President take the right action? (1 worst decision
possible, 7 best decision possible)
Text box: Why? (Please write any thoughts)
Counterfactual consideration (unused)
Now consider the alternative scenarios that could have occurred: if the President took
action, it could have resulted in a unnecessary waste of resources or it could have resulted
in the terrorist threat being mitigated. If the President did not take action, it could have
obviated the need to expend resources unnecessarily or it could have resulted in a
disastrous strike by terrorists.

Question: Now after considering the alternatives, to what extent was the President
justified in taking the action that was taken?
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Text box: Please enter your reasoning for why you think the President was justified or
unjustified in taking the action that they took, after taking into consideration the potential
alternative outcomes.

Study 3
Accountability manipulation language
No accountability condition: Imagine you are the mayor of a small town. You are in your
second term and you will not be facing re-election because you are term limited.
Accountability condition: Imagine you are the mayor of a small town. You are in the first
term of
your and you are seeking re-election in November 2016.
For each of the above conditions: skip logic to end of block
Slider choices (randomized, single item presented, three total items, page break
between)
Environmental protection issue
Low uncertainty: You made a promise during your campaign that you would protect the
environment. The city council has sent you a bill authorizing the release of funds to clean
up the town’s reservoir, which was recently found to contain high levels of contaminants.
Your advisors believe that signing this executive order has a 90% chance of saving
approximately 100 lives a year. However, the high cost of the clean up efforts will mean
that a hospital you planned to renovate will not be fixed during your term. According to
hospital officials, the new renovations would have saved 90 lives a year.
Question 1: As currently described, how likely are you to sign the bill into law?
Slider 0-100%
Question 2: Your advisors tell you that they can ask for further research to be done on the
effectiveness of the cleanup efforts. What amount of uncertainty reduction would you
need to be 100% likely to sign the executive order?
Slider 0-10%
(present questions 1 and 2 as a single item, skip logic to end of block)
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Medium uncertainty: You made a promise during your campaign that you would protect
the environment. The city council has sent you a bill authorizing the release of funds to
clean up the town’s reservoir, which was recently found to contain high levels of
contaminants.
Your advisors believe that signing this executive order has a 50% chance of saving
approximately 100 lives a year. However, the high cost of the clean up efforts will mean
that a hospital you planned to renovate will not be fixed during your term. According to
hospital officials, the new renovations would have saved 50 lives a year.
Question 1: As currently described, how likely are you to sign the bill into law?
Slider 0-100%
Question 2: Your advisors tell you that they can ask for further research to be done on the
effectiveness of the clean up efforts. What amount of uncertainty reduction would you
need to be 100% likely to sign the executive order?
Slider 0-50%
(present questions 1 and 2 as a single item, skip logic to end of block)
High uncertainty: You made a promise during your campaign that you would protect the
environment. The city council has sent you a bill authorizing the release of funds to clean
up the town’s reservoir, which was recently found to contain high levels of contaminants.
Your advisors believe that signing this executive order has a 10% chance of saving
approximately 100 lives a year. However, the high cost of the clean up efforts will mean
that a hospital you planned to renovate will not be fixed during your term. According to
hospital officials, the new renovations would have saved 10 lives a year.
Question 1: As currently described, how likely are you to sign the bill into law?
Slider 0-100%
Question 2: Your advisors tell you that they can ask for further research to be done on the
effectiveness of the clean up efforts. What amount of uncertainty reduction would you
need to be 100% likely to sign the executive order?
Slider 0-90%
(present questions 1 and 2 as a single item, skip logic to end of block)
For all three of the above conditions (low, medium, high): skip logic to end of block
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Block 4
Slider choices (randomized, single item presented, three total items, page break
between)
Gun Control (leave this title out), Labeled Safety
Low uncertainty: You made a promise during your campaign that you would tackle the
issue of guns in your community. The city council has sent you a bill authorizing
stringent background investigations for gun buyers.
Your advisors estimate that this bill has a 90% chance of saving 100 lives a year that
would have been lost due to gun violence. However, devoting additional manpower to
conduct background investigations will require taking several police officers off of street
duty. Police leadership believe that 90 people a year will die without these officers on
patrol.
Question 1: As currently described, how likely are you to sign the bill into law?
Slider 0-100%
Question 2: Your advisors tell you that they can ask for further research to be done on the
bill. What amount of uncertainty reduction would you need to be 100% likely to sign the
executive order?
Slider 0-10%
(present questions 1 and 2 as a single item)
Medium uncertainty: You made a promise during your campaign that you would tackle
the issue of guns in your community. The city council has sent you a bill authorizing
stringent background investigations for gun buyers.
Your advisors estimate that this bill has a 50% chance of saving 100 lives a year that
would have been lost due to gun violence. However, devoting additional manpower to
conduct background investigations will require taking several police officers off of street
duty. Police leadership believe that 50 people a year will die without these officers on
patrol.
Question 1: As currently described, how likely are you to sign the bill into law?
Slider 0-100%
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Question 2: Your advisors tell you that they can ask for further research to be done on the
bill. What amount of uncertainty reduction would you need to be 100% likely to sign the
executive order?
Slider 0-50%
(present questions 1 and 2 as a single item, skip logic to end of block)
High uncertainty: You made a promise during your campaign that you would tackle the
issue of guns in your community. The city council has sent you a bill authorizing
stringent background investigations for gun buyers.
Your advisors estimate that this bill has a 10% chance of saving 100 lives a year that
would have been lost due to gun violence. However, devoting additional manpower to
conduct background investigations will require taking several police officers off of street
duty. Police leadership believe that 10 people a year will die without these officers on
patrol.
Question 1: As currently described, how likely are you to sign the bill into law?
Slider 0-100%
Question 2: Your advisors tell you that they can ask for further research to be done on the
bill. What amount of uncertainty reduction would you need to be 100% likely to sign the
executive order?
Slider 0-90%
Study 4
Experiment 1
Overall situation setup
The independence movement inside the province of Apple has pushed the central
government to hold a referendum on whether or not Apple should be independent from
the Union of Provinces. The winning side in the referendum needs to receive over 50% of
the total votes cast.
You will be asked to estimate the likelihood that the “No camp” will win the election.
You will be presented new information about the election and you will be asked to update
your estimates after each new piece of information.
In the accountability condition: You will be asked to explain your rationales for why
you assigned the probability that you assigned. Please write a rationale of a sentence
or longer.
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Low certainty starting point
At three weeks before the referendum, the “No independence” camp’s lead has dwindled
and the two are now running at a statistical dead heat (50/50). There is still a lot of time
before the referendum vote though: Apple citizens are beginning to pay more attention to
the referendum and a series of debates is about to start.
1. Current Polling Trends. Through most of the year, the No vote held a consistent lead
in the available polls. But at the "3 weeks to go" mark, the No camp is even with the Yes
camp.
Given this evidence, how likely is it that the No camp will win the election? (Slider)
2. Public Figures Chime In. The Prime Minister of the Union of Provinces offers a new
package of self-rule initiatives on taxes and social policy if Apple votes No to
independence. The most famous author in Apple publicly urges his compatriots to vote
No on secession. A very senior diplomat born in Apple who served for 30 years in senior
roles for the Union of Provinces urges Apple to vote Yes, saying a
sovereign Apple would still "fit naturally alongside" other nations in regional
organizations.
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No
camp will win the election? (Slider)
3. Political Slogans. The key Yes theme has been hope for a new future. The Key No
theme has been uncertainty and the risks of Apple going it alone in the world.
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No
camp will win the election? (Slider)
4. Latest Polling Data. Entering the final two weeks, a poll puts the Yes camp in the lead
for the first time. Trendlines show opponents and undecideds breaking toward yes,
although most polls still show an overall lead for the No camp. After the final public
debate, 71% of voters say the pro-independence leader won the debate.
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No
camp will win the election? (Slider)
5. Past Referendums Part A. A study of 34 referendums on the subject of independence
or constitutional reform since 1980 found an average swing of 11% of votes toward the
status quo in the final month of polling. Critics of the study point out the cases are too
different to be directly comparable.
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Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No
camp will win the election? (Slider)
6. Past Referendums Part B. A noted sociologist commented that polls had
overestimated the Yes or pro-change vote in 12 of 16 referendums around the world. The
sociologist also said the polls may be underestimating the No vote because of a "spiral of
silence".
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No
camp will win the election? (Slider)
7. Polling Models. Another study concludes that polling models have a difficult time
accounting for people who rarely or never vote in regular elections but will come out for
big issues like independence referendums.
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No
camp will win the election? (Slider)
High certainty starting point
At three weeks before the referendum, the “No independence” camp’s lead has solidified
and they now have a significant lead over the “Yes independence” camp. There is still a
lot of time before the referendum vote though: Applans are beginning to pay more
attention to the referendum and a series of debates is about to start.
1. Current Polling Trends. Through most of the year, the No vote held a consistent lead
in the available polls. But at the "3 weeks to go" mark, the No camp has pulled ahead of
the Yes camp.
Given this evidence, how likely is it that the No camp will win the election? (Slider)
2. Public Figures Chime In. The Prime Minister of the Union of Provinces offers a new
package of self-rule intiatives on taxes and social policy if Apple votes No to
independence. The most famous author in Apple publicly urges his compatriots to vote
No on secession. A very senior diplomat born in Apple who served for 30 years in senior
roles for the Union of Provinces urges Apple to vote Yes, saying a
sovereign Apple would still "fit naturally alongside" other nations in regional
organizations.
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No
camp will win the election? (Slider)
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3. Political Slogans. The key Yes theme has been hope for a new future. The Key No
theme has been uncertainty and the risks of Apple going it alone in the world.
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No
camp will win the election? (Slider)
4. Latest Polling Data. Entering the final two weeks, a poll puts the Yes camp in the lead
for the first time. Trendlines show opponents and undecideds breaking toward yes,
although most polls still show an overall lead for the No camp. After the final public
debate, 71% of voters say the pro-independence leader won the debate.
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No
camp will win the election? (Slider)
5. Past Referendums Part A. A study of 34 referendums on the subject of independence
or constitutional reform since 1980 found an average swing of 11% of votes toward the
status quo in the final month of polling. Critics of the study point out the cases are too
different to be directly comparable.
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No
camp will win the election? (Slider)

6. Past Referendums Part B. A noted sociologist commented that polls had
overestimated the Yes or pro-change vote in 12 of 16 referendums around the world. The
sociologist also said the polls may be underestimating the No vote because of a "spiral of
silence".
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No
camp will win the election? (Slider)
7. Polling Models. Another study concludes that polling models have a difficult time
accounting for people who rarely or never vote in regular elections but will come out for
big issues like independence referendums.
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No
camp will win the election? (Slider)

For accountability conditions, add text box, please explain why you made the
estimate that you made
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Experiment 2
Bayesian Version
High Certainty = 95% of past referendums in this country have succeeded. Citizens of
Apple tend to vote for changing the status quo.
Low Certainty = 50% of past referendums in this country have succeeded. Citizens of
Apple tend to be uncertain about change and approach it cautiously.
Low Certainty
1. Current Polling Trends. The most recent polling data shows more support for
secession than unity. You know from studying the polls that they are predictive of
election outcomes in seven out of the last ten elections, when the outcome of the election
is for a change to the status quo (such as a secession).
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry)
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 1 =

(0.7)(0.5)
= 70%
0.7 0.5 + (0.3)(1 − 0.5)

2. Public Figures Chime In. The Prime Minister of the Union of Provinces offers a new
package of self-rule initiatives on taxes and social policy if Apple votes for unity. You
know from past attempts at mollifying the Applan citizenry that new packages of policies
appeal only six out of the last ten times.
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry)
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 2 =

(0.6)(0.7)
= 77.78%
0.6 0.7 + (0.4)(1 − 0.7)

3. Political Slogans. You believe that the group in favor of secession has the more
compelling slogan. From past referendums, you know that the group who you felt had the
more compelling slogan has won two out of the last ten referendums.
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry)
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 3 =

(0.2)(0.7778)
= 46.67%
0.2 0.7778 + (0.8)(1 − 0.7778)

4. Latest Polling Data. As the vote draws near, both groups increase the frequency of
their rallies. Although both sides are holding a comparable number of rallies, statistics
indicate that the group favoring secession has an average rally size that is three times that
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of the opposition’s. In past situations, rally size has been a correct indicator for how the
vote would play out in one out of the last ten referendums.
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry)
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 4 =

(0.1)(0.4667)
= 8.862%
0.1 0.4667 + (0.9)(1 − 0.4667)

5. Past Referendums. A study of past referendums on the subject of independence or
constitutional reform found that they have a higher chance of failing than referendums on
other subjects. The results revealed that seven out of the last ten referendums on the
subject of independence or constitutional reform had passed.
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry)
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 5 =

(0.7)(0.08862)
= 18.49%
0.7 0.08862 + (0.3)(1 − 0.08862)

6. Debate. One week before the referendum, the nation holds a debate between the group
in favor of secession and the group in favor of unity. After the debate, news outlets begin
reporting that the group in favor of secession had won the debate. In the past, six out of
the last ten winners of a debate of this scale were able to win their referendums.
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry)
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 6 =

(0.6)(0.1849)
= 25.39%
0.6 0.1849 + (0.4)(1 − 0.1849)

7. Polling Models. Waiting in line to vote, you receive news that the polling models that
news outlets have been using has a high likelihood of inaccuracy. Only four out the last
ten polling models have accurately predicted the referendum results.
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry)
(0.4)(0.2539)
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 7 =
= 18.49%
0.4 0.2539 + (0.6)(1 − 0.2539)
High Certainty
1. Current Polling Trends. The most recent polling data shows more support for
secession than unity. You know from studying the polls that they are predictive of
election outcomes in seven out of the last ten elections, when the outcome of the election
is for a change to the status quo (such as a secession).
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry)
144

𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 1 =

(0.7)(0.95)
= 97.79%
0.7 0.95 + (0.3)(1 − 0.95)

2. Public Figures Chime In. The Prime Minister of the Union of Provinces offers a new
package of self-rule initiatives on taxes and social policy if Apple votes for unity. You
know from past attempts at mollifying the Applan citizenry that new packages of policies
appeal only six out of the last ten times.
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry)
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 2 =

(0.6)(0.9779)
= 98.52%
0.6 0.9779 + (0.4)(1 − 0.9779)

3. Political Slogans. You believe that the group in favor of secession has the more
compelling slogan. From past referendums, you know that the group who you felt had the
more compelling slogan has won two out of the last ten referendums.
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry)
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 3 =

(0.2)(0.9852)
= 94.33%
0.2 0.9852 + (0.8)(1 − 0.9852)

4. Latest Polling Data. As the vote draws near, both groups increase the frequency of
their rallies. Although both sides are holding a comparable number of rallies, statistics
indicate that the group favoring secession has an average rally size that is three times that
of the opposition’s. In past situations, rally size has been a correct indicator for how the
vote would play out in one out of the last ten referendums.
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry)
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 4 =

(0.1)(0.9433)
= 64.89%
0.1 0.9433 + (0.9)(1 − 0.9433)

5. Past Referendums. A study of past referendums on the subject of independence or
constitutional reform found that they have a higher chance of failing than referendums on
other subjects. The results revealed that seven out of the last ten referendums on the
subject of independence or constitutional reform had passed.
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry)
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𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 5 =

(0.7)(0.6489)
= 81.18%
0.7 0.6489 + (0.3)(1 − 0.6489)

6. Debate. One week before the referendum, the nation holds a debate between the group
in favor of secession and the group in favor of unity. After the debate, news outlets begin
reporting that the group in favor of secession had won the debate. In the past, six out of
the last ten winners of a debate of this scale were able to win their referendums.
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry)
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 6 =

(0.6)(0.8118)
= 86.61%
0.6 0.8118 + (0.4)(1 − 0.8118)

7. Polling Models. Waiting in line to vote, you receive news that the polling models that
news outlets have been using has a high likelihood of inaccuracy. Only four out the last
ten polling models have accurately predicted the referendum results.
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry)
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 7 =

(0.4)(0.8661)
= 81.18%
0.4 0.8661 + (0.6)(1 − 0.8661)
Study 5

Insight Puzzles
Baghdad Attack (Duncker’s Radiation Problem Isomorph)
Imagine you are the chief intelligence advisor to a military commander in charge of
attacking Baghdad (the capital city of Iraq). At the time of the attack, Iraq is ruled by
Saddam Hussein, who presides from within the capital. The city is situated in the middle
of the country, surrounded by farms and villages. Many roads lead to the capital through
the Iraqi countryside, but the countryside itself is too rough for your men to pass through
directly. To take the city, your commander knows he will need to get his entire army
inside the city walls. In order to do so, he has gathered his army at the head of one of the
roads, ready to launch a full-scale direct assault. Before the attack begins, however, the
general learns that Saddam had planted explosive mines on each of the roads. The mines
were set so that small groups of men could pass over them safely, since the dictator
needed to move his troops and workers to and from the capital. However, any large force
would detonate the mines. Not only would this destroy the road, but it would also destroy
many neighboring villages. The commander knows that the entire force and the element
of surprise are necessary to take the city, given the strength of the defenders. It therefore
seems impossible to capture the city. What do you advise your commander to do?
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Special Operations Mission (Missionaries and cannibals riddle isomorph)
Imagine you are the mission commander of a small special operations team tasked with
extracting three high value targets (in this case, high ranking terrorist leaders) inside a
hostile country. Because the country you are operating in does not have knowledge of
your presence, your superior officer has only authorized three individuals to enter the city
where the targets are being held. Your team members report that they have arrived at the
enemy compound (Objective Green) and located all three targets. The team members are
disguised as civilians and must transport these targets to a safe house (Objective Blue)
approximately 1 mile from Objective Green, where they will wait for an extraction team
(a stealth helicopter landing on the roof). Your team members have acquired a small
civilian vehicle that can transport up to a total of three individuals at any one time. You
must develop a plan for all of your team members and all of the targets to be transported
to Objective Blue. At no time can the team members be outnumbered by the targets
because the targets can overpower the team members if they find themselves with a
numerical advantage. The vehicle must be driven by a team member and cannot be sent
from Objective Blue to Green or from Objective Green to Blue without any occupants
(i.e., it cannot drive itself or be controlled remotely). Write out a plan to get everyone,
team members and targets, to Objective Blue.
Drone Surveillance (Mutilated Chessboard Problem Isomorph)

A terrorist target has just been located in a large city that is approximately 62 square
miles (see the city layout above). In order to ensure that the terrorist target does not leave
undetected, you have been ordered to conduct drone surveillance of the city. If each
drone can cover 2 contiguous square miles of the city, what is the minimum number of
drones you would need to cover the entire city? Why do you need that many drones?
Air Defense (Tree Planting Riddle Isomorph)
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Imagine you are in charge of protecting a sensitive military installation with ten defensive
emplacements (in this case, surface-to-air missile units). In order to properly defend the
site, the ten defensive emplacements must be arrayed in five rows of four emplacements
each. How should you array the emplacements?
Answers:
1. Since the entire force is required to capture the city, it is necessary for the commander
to move the whole Army into the center of the city. However, it is not necessary to move
the entire Army along the same road. The commander should be advised to split the
Army into smaller elements and move them along as many roads as necessary to avoid
tripping the mines.
2. Yes, it is possible to move the detainees from one objective to the other.
OBJ Green --> Vehicle --> OBJ Blue
abc123-->
1a -->
--->
a
1 <-123bc<-12b -->
1a
<--2b
23bc
23b-->
12ab
3 <-3c
3c-->
123abc
3. You need 32 drones to cover the 62 squares. Because of how the city is arrayed, it is
impossible to cover all 62 squares with only 31 drones.
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4. You should array the ten batteries in a star shape
x
x

x
x

x x
x
x

x

x

Algebra Problems
1. (3x2 + 2x + 10)(3x) =
2. (2x + y)(3x - y) =
3. Factor: 16y2 - 40yz + 25z2
4. Find X

5. 18x2 + (24x / 3x) =
6. Factor: x2 + 6x + 9
7. Solve for x: (1/5)(x) + 10 – 25 = 0
8. (-6x2y4) / (3x5y3) =
Answers
Alg1.
Alg2.
Alg3.
Alg4.
6
Alg5.
Alg6.
Alg7.
75
Alg8.
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Individual Differences and Manipulation Check Scales
Post-Experiment Accountability Manipulation Check
I believe I
will be
evaluated
on the
decision
making
strategies I
utilized (and
not on the
accuracy of
the
outcomes)

I believe I
will be
evaluated
on the
accuracy of
my final
predictions
(and not on
the
decision
making
strategies I
utilized)
[PAOA1]
The
researchers
will ask me
to explain
why my
final
predictions
were right
or wrong.
[PAOA2]

The
researchers
will ask me
to explain
the decision
making
strategy I
used to
make my
final
predictions.
The
researchers
are more
concerned
with how I
made my
decisions
and the
effectiveness
of my
decision
making
strategies.
Even if my

The
researchers
are more
concerned
with
whether my
predictions
are
ultimately
right or
wrong.
[PAOA3]
Even if the
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predictions
are
inaccurate, I
may still be
evaluated
favorably if
the strategy
I used to
make my
decisions
was sound.

strategies I
used to
make my
decisions
are sound, I
will still be
evaluated
unfavorably
if my final
decisions
are
ultimately
wrong.
[PAOA4]

Please describe in the box below how you went about making your predictions
Why did you choose to make your predictions in this way?
4. [Measures of rational/analytic reasoning – Novak & Hoffman, 2008]
While making my predictions…
1. I reasoned things out
carefully. [Analytic1]
2. I tackled the task
systematically.[Analytic2]
3. I figured things out
logically. [Analytic3]
4. I approached the task
analytically.[Analytic4]
5. I was very focused on the steps
involved in doing it. [Analytic5]
6. I applied precise rules to deduce my
final predictions. [Analytic6]
7. I was very focused on what I was
doing to arrive at my final
predictions. [Analytic7]
8. I was very aware of my thinking
process.[Analytic8]
9. I arrived at my final predictions by
carefully assessing the information in
front of me. [Analytic9]
10. I used clear rules. [Analytic10]

Disagree
strongly
1

2

3

4

5

6

Agree
strongly
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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5. [Emotions]
Not
at
all
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Happy [Happy]
Contented [Content]
Gloomy [Gloomy]
Tense [Tense]
Good [Good]
Agreeable [Agreeable]
Discouraged [Discouraged]
Peaceful [Peaceful]
Upset [Upset]
Mad [Mad]
Disgusted [Disgusted]
Fearful [Fearful]
Stressed [Stressed]

Very
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

5. Need for cognition scale
[Need for cognition (shortened), Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984]
[Randomize items]
Strongly
disagree
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
agree
7

2. I like to have the responsibility of
handling a situation that requires
a lot of thinking. [NCog2]

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. Thinking is not my idea of
fun.* [NCog3]

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. I would rather do something that
requires little thought than

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. I would prefer complex to simple
problems. [NCog1]
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something that is sure to
challenge my thinking
abilities.*[NCog4]
5. I try to anticipate and avoid
situations where there is likely a
chance I will have to think in
depth about something.*[NCog5]

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6. I find satisfaction in deliberating
hard and for long hours. [NCog6]

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7. I only think as hard as I have
to.*[NCog7]

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8. I prefer to think about small, daily
projects to long-term
ones.* [NCog8]

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9. I like tasks that require little
thought once I’ve learned
them.* [NCog9]

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10. The idea of relying on thought to
make my way to the top appeals
to me.[NCog10]

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

11. I really enjoy a task that involves
coming up with new solutions to
problems.[NCog11]

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

12. Learning new ways to think
doesn’t excite me very
much.* [NCog12]

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

13. I prefer my life to be filled with
puzzles that I must
solve. [NCog13]

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

14. The notion of thinking abstractly
is appealing to me. [NCog14]

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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15. I would prefer a task that is
intellectual, difficult, and
important to one that is somewhat
important but does not require
much thought. [NCog15]

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

16. I feel relief rather than
satisfaction after completing a
task that required a lot of mental
effort.* [NCog16]

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

17. It’s enough for me that something
gets the job done; I don’t care
how or why it works.* [NCog17]

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

18. I usually end up deliberating
about issues even when they do
not affect me
personally. [NCog18]

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7. Big 5

Strongly
disagree
1
1. I get chores done right away. [Consc1]
1
2. I often forget to put things back in
their proper place. [Consc2]
1
3. I like order. [Consc3]
1
4. I make a mess of things [Consc4]
1
5. I sympathize with others’
feelings. [Agree1]
1
6. I am not interested in other people’s
problems. [Agree2]
1
7. I feel others’ emotions. [Agree3]
1
8. I am not really interested in
others. [Agree4]
1
9. I am the life of the party. [Extro1]
1
10. I don’t talk a lot. [Extro2]
1
11. I talk to a lot of different people at
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2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

Strongly
agree
7
7

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

6
6
6

7
7
7

2

3

4

5

6

7

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

6
6
6

7
7
7

parties.[Extro3]
12. I keep in the background. [Extro4]
13. I have a vivid imagination. [Open1]
14. I am not interested in abstract
ideas. [Open2]
15. I have difficulty understanding
abstract ideas. [Open3]
16. I do not have a good
imagination. [Open4]
17. I have frequent mood
swings [Neuro1]
18. I am relaxed most of the
time. [Neuro2]
19. I get upset easily. [Neuro3]
20. I seldom feel blue. [Neuro4]

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

6
6
6

7
7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

Fluid Intelligence Measure
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
Please answer the following questions: [Frederick, 2005, Journal of Economic
Perspectives]
(a) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost? ______ [5 cents] [CR1]
(b) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets? ______ [5 minutes] [CR2]
(c) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to
cover half of the lake? ______ [47 days] [CR3]
Cognitive Motivation Measure
Actively Open Minded Thinking (AOMT)

1. Allowing oneself to be convinced by
an opposing argument is a sign of good
character

Strongly
disagree
1
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2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
agree
7

2. People should take into consideration
evidence that goes against their beliefs.
3. People should revise their beliefs in
response to new information or
evidence.
4. Changing your mind is a sign of
weakness.
5. Intuition is the best guide in making
decisions
6. It is important to persevere in your
beliefs even when evidence is brought to
bear against them.
7. One should disregard evidence that
conflicts with one's established beliefs.
8. People should search actively for
reasons why their beliefs might be
wrong.
9. It is more useful to pay attention to
those who disagree with us than to pay
attention to those who agree.
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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